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This study (N = 557) explored how empathy towards victims and perpetrators of 
terrorism were associated with broadband (e.g., HEXACO traits; Dark Triad traits) and 
narrowband individual differences (e.g., beliefs in a competitive and dangerous world, 
social dominance orientation, religiousness, and right-wing authoritarianism) in samples 
drawn from Turkish and Australian undergraduates. Country differences revealed 
Turkish participants were higher in Dark Triad traits, social dominance orientation, 
right-wing authoritarianism, and religiousness than Australian participants. Australian 
participants had more empathy towards both victims and perpetrators of terrorism than 
Turkish participants. Sex differences in personality traits showed men displayed a 
“darker” personality, than the “lighter” personality of women. The implications of these 
findings were discussed in relation to the current threat of terrorism in Australia and 
Turkey. This study provided one of the first quantitative, cross-cultural assessments of 
empathy towards terrorism using the methods of personality psychology.   
Keywords: terrorism; empathy; personality; individual differences; cross-
country 
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Individual Differences in Empathy towards Terrorism 
What could possess someone to commit acts of terrorism? Since the September 
11 attacks in 2001, governments have been scrambling to increase the defence of 
countries (Barros, 2003). The “war on terrorism” has dominated the political arena, and 
not many answers for how to combat this problem are available (Nacos, 2012). 
Increasing occurrences of targeted attacks imply that government protection agencies 
and defence systems are failing to combat these events. Just like any other standard 
form of intentional crime, in order to combat its occurrence, it should be studied as a 
mechanism of human behaviour and psychology. Terrorism is a form of human 
aggression and violence committed by individuals or groups. “Terrorists” are 
individuals engaging in political or religious violence, derived from varying amounts of 
external influence and context as opposed to external command (Feldman, 2013). This 
positions terrorists as rational beings who commit malevolent crime, however, does not 
also mean that terrorists may also be irrational. With increasing occurrences of terrorist 
attacks around the world, it is crucial that empirical research surrounding terrorism 
moves towards offering information useful for prevention (Barros, 2003), and gauging 
attitudes of empathy towards terrorism may be one way of achieving this. 
Studies examining individual personality traits and attitudes towards terrorism 
are limited. A review of the existing literature reveals studies on terrorism as being 
inductively atheoretical (Enders & Sandler, 1995), with a focus on the effectiveness of 
government negotiation strategies to deter terrorism. Reviews of prior work on 
terrorism offer the opinion that both theoretical and empirical accounts of terrorism fail 
to consider the heterogeneity of terrorists (Victoroff, 2005). An overview of the 
progress of terrorism research also summarise that majority of studies use secondary 
analysis (i.e., analyses based on archival records; Silke, 2001). Instead of treating 
terrorism as a behaviour that individuals engage in, most research examines terrorism at 
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a social or group level, rather than an individual level. These collectively fail to take 
individual differences (i.e., personality traits) into account when arriving at research 
conclusions about terrorism. Ultimately terrorism is committed by individuals, and thus 
rather than continue with top-down research (i.e., group to individual) this study is 
concerned with the individual differences from a bottom-up view on terrorism.   
Sociological theories attempt to explain terrorism as a cultural misalignment of 
socially learned behaviour (Phillips, 2015). However, these do not specifically address 
the crucial importance of individual differences in relation to human behaviour, and 
attitudes that form as a result. Psychologically speaking, personality traits are the 
building blocks that influence who we are, what we do, and how we think. They 
influence many aspects of the lives of humans. There is an abundance of psychological 
theories of personality from differing theoretical backgrounds, including humanistic 
(Rogers, 1959), psychodynamic (Freud, 1923), behaviourist (Skinner, 1953), 
evolutionary (Buss, 1995), social learning (Bandura, 1969), and dispositional (trait) 
(Cattell, 1965) perspectives. This study focuses on the latter dispositional (trait) model, 
which has dominated personality research for the past 15 years. Personality traits have 
predictive power over general health outcomes including self-reported blood pressure, 
sick days taken from work, and overall self-rated physical health (Turiano, et al., 2011). 
Personality traits also interact with goal setting to initiate motivation to strive for 
achieving work outcomes (Barrick, Mount, & Li, 2013), risk-taking and impulsivity 
(Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000), compassion, sympathy, and altruistic helping 
behaviours (Eisenberg, et al., 1989), and temperament (Buss & Plomin, 2014) to name a 
few. Aside from influencing behaviour, they also play a role in humour styles (Veselka, 
Schermer, Martin, & Vernon, 2010), self-presentation whilst using social media (Lee, 
Ahn, & Kim, 2014), personal values (Parks-Leduc, Feldman, & Bardi, 2015), and even 
choice of sexual partner (Jonason, Lyons, & Blanchard, 2015). It is an ever-present part 
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of every individual. However, there is a severe lack of empirical evidence on the 
relationship between personality factors and attitudes related to intergroup aggression 
and violence, which might perpetuate terrorism (Feldman, 2013).  
Empirical and theoretical evidence supports the idea that personality traits 
influence attitudes toward in-groups and out-groups (Hodson & Dhont, 2015). 
Individual differences (i.e., personality traits) have consistently been associated with 
prejudice beliefs and racism (Guimond et al., 2013; Hodson & Dhont, 2015; Levin et 
al., 2016). There also seems to be associations between the domain-general aspects of 
individual differences, such as Dark Triad traits of psychopathy and Machiavellianism, 
and domain-specific attitudes that support social dominance of the in-group, right wing 
authoritarianism, dangerous and competitive perceptions of the world, religiosity, and 
conservatism. These domain-specific aspects imply that prejudice is an “Us vs. Them” 
ideologically driven mechanism of attitudes.  
If prejudice is a form of biased in-group perception, then this could extend to 
individual differences associated with intergroup violence, and thus, a bias towards 
terrorism. Past research demonstrates that prejudice attitudes may manifest into racist 
violence towards the out-group (McKeever, Reed, Pehrson, Storey, & Cohrs, 2013). 
Similarly, comparisons of factors influencing support of intergroup violence as a 
product of attitudes supporting in-group or out-group aggression. Considering these 
links, the measures and methods used to study prejudice are therefore also useful for the 
study of attitudes towards terrorism. 
Comparisons of Western (i.e., American) and Middle Eastern (i.e., Lebanese) 
participant attitudes towards terrorism reflect that Westerners have stronger attitudes 
supporting social dominance, right wing authoritarianism, and support of the American 
intervention in the Middle East (Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 2005). However, the 
results are opposite with Lebanese Middle-Eastern participants. Additionally, Australian 
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Anglo-Saxon’s hold stronger racist attitudes to an in-group/out-group bias, although 
Australian Middle Easterners do not share this; instead, out-group Australian Middle 
Easterners hold beliefs that the world is a dangerous and competitive place (Jonason, 
2015). This suggests that individuals belonging to minority out-groups may hold 
positive attitudes toward in-group directed terrorism by way of latent biases of 
intergroup aggression. Considering the close relations this trend has with a longing for 
social dominance and heavy authoritarian views, it suggests that specific individual 
factors may predispose people to hold relevant attitudes.  
Acts of terrorism are thought to be an expression of “malevolent creativity” 
(Gill, Horgan, Hunter, & Cushenbery, 2013) associated with distinct personality traits 
that also predict aggressive behaviours (Hosie, Gilbert, Simpson, & Daffern, 2014), 
such as agreeableness and conscientiousness. This is a result of researchers questioning 
whether personality traits may have an association with how creative a terrorist may 
become with organising and executing an attack that maximises damage and attracts 
global attention. These broadband personality factors are measured through self-report 
trait questionnaires such as the HEXACO-60; a broad, validated, self-report measure of 
personality (Ashton & Lee, 2007). It measures individual factors pertaining to Honesty-
Humility (H), Emotionality (E), Extraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), 
Conscientiousness (C), and Openness to Experience (O). Low Emotionality has been 
associated with intergroup disgust (Hodson & Dhont, 2015) towards outgroup members. 
Extraversion and Openness to Experience has been associated with social dominance, a 
preference for inequality among social groups, and right-wing authoritarian attitudes 
(Lee, Ashton, Ogunfowara, Bourdage, & Shin, 2010; Sibley, Harding, Perry, Asbrock, 
& Duckitt, 2010). Openness to Experience is also closely related to creativity, and 
secondary-analyses of terrorist profiles have assumed that terrorists using dark creativity 
would reflect stronger Openness to Experience (Viktoroff, 2005). Dark creativity also 
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resonates with a specific constellation of dark personality traits, more commonly known 
as the Dark Triad traits (Jonason et al., 2017). 
The Dark Triad is an umbrella term used to describe a cluster of socially 
undesirable traits of personality, which include narcissism, Machiavellianism and 
psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Whereas “narcissism” encompasses a sense 
of grandiosity, egotism, self-orientation, and lack of empathy, “Machiavellianism” is 
associated with manipulative behaviour, self-interest, exploitation of others, and a 
ruthless lack of morality. The third aspect – subclinical “psychopathy” – is associated 
with reckless, cruel and callous behaviour, antisocial selfish behaviour, and a lack of 
empathic skill and remorse. The Dark Triad traits have since been found as strong 
predictors of deception in various contexts (Baughman, Jonason, Lyons, & Vernon, 
2014) and aggression (Jonason, Duineveld, & Middleton, 2015). Aggressiveness is also 
a core component to the measurement of the Dark Triad traits, but is expressed in 
relation to the vanity of the traits which are also correlated with verbal and physical 
aggression, as well as hostility (for example, items from the Dirty Dozen Dark Triad 
scale including “I tend to want others to admire me”, and “I tend to not be too 
concerned with morality or the morality of my actions”; Jonason & Webster, 2010).  
Certain aspects of the Dark Triad − Machiavellianism and psychopathy in 
particular – are strong predictors of religious sinning (i.e., the seven deadly sins, such as 
lust, gluttony, greed; Jonason, Ziegler-Hill, & Okan, 2017). The commissions of sin or 
vice (i.e., religious sinning), may be understood as a function of behavioural 
dysregulation, whereby individuals engage in activities that go against religious morals 
and beliefs (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000). If the behavioural dysregulation 
of sin or vice may be a result of psychological or physical dysfunction, then this could 
also be the case for other contexts of behavioural dysregulation, such as terrorism. Acts 
of terrorism catalysed by the desire to harm a mass amount of people instil fear en 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 6 
 
masse (Enders & Sandler, 1995). This implies a dysregulation of the crucial human 
emotion that is empathy, which individuals follow as an ethical code to being “good 
natured” (de Waal, 1996). Suggestions that narcissistic personalities are more adept to 
join terrorist groups, and have empathic attitudes toward terrorism (Johnson & 
Feldmann, 1992) are noteworthy. However, no prior research has specifically explored 
attitudes of empathy towards victims and perpetrators of terrorism, which is what the 
current study aimed to do. 
Empathy is an emotional response (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983) and the capacity 
that humans and other species have to resonate with the positive and negative feelings 
of others (Singer & Klimecki, 2014). It is no surprise then that clinical cases of 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder are characterised by a dysfunctional lack of empathy, 
subject to motivational and situational factors (Baskin-Sommers, Krusemark, & 
Ronningstam, 2014). A lack of empathy is also the core characteristic of psychopathy 
(White, 2014). Although a defining feature of personality disorders, a lack of empathy 
is also shared by non-clinical individuals with increased aggressive behaviours 
(Bartholow, Sestir, & Davis, 2005). As such, aggression is predictable based on low 
emotional intelligence and a lack of empathy (i.e., disregard for the emotion of others) 
in non-clinical individuals (Piko & Pinczés, 2014). A lack of empathy also leads to a 
dehumanisation effect, involving the individual to view other persons in a way that 
separates them from the ability to feel (Haslem & Stratemeyer, 2016). This 
dehumanisation phenomenon is also seen in inter-group aggression, whereby the in-
group experiences a dehumanisation effect towards outgroup members. This has 
specifically been studied in the context of terrorism, and is even evident in 
dehumanising attitudes towards in-group members of western Americans, by outgroup 
Muslim Americans. So much so does this phenomenon have an effect on empathy, that 
the more dehumanised a member of the outgroup feels, the stronger the dehumanisation 
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effect will be in return towards in-group members (Bruneau, 2016). In relation to the 
context of terrorism, this means that seeing the enemy as an “other” may facilitate 
individuals killing out-group members without experiencing the feeling of empathy.  
If the behavioural dysregulation of inter-group aggression is a result of 
psychological dysfunction both in empathy and in general, then this could explain why 
some individuals are attracted to terrorism. The individual factors to predict aggression 
and violence such as attitudes of prejudice, racism, and a burning desire to harm others, 
may also then predict positive empathic attitudes toward perpetrators of terrorism. This 
possible explanation is consistent with past predictions of terrorist individuals as driven 
by specific internal drives (Feldman, 2013), and implies a relationship between 
individual differences in empathy towards terrorism, which the current study explores.  
Other individual factors (e.g., social dominance orientation, authoritarianist 
views, beliefs the world is a dangerous and competitive place, religiousness and 
conservatism) are efficient measures and methods in gaining information about attitudes 
in relation to intrinsic motivators of prejudice (Hodson & Dhont, 2015) as they provide 
a broad range of individual differences in personality to consider. These measures may 
also be utilised to examine intergroup aggression as a further extension of intergroup 
negativity and prejudice-inspired attitude. Other comparisons of factors influencing 
support of intergroup violence as a product of in-group or out-group aggression have 
also used measures of social dominance orientation, right-wing authoritarianism, and 
support of terrorism (Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 2005). However, the past studies 
examined attitudes toward terrorism violence with a primary focus on anti-Western and 
anti-Arab violence concerning the U.S decision to combat the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
The current study incorporated the methods and measures used to explore prejudice 
within the study design (Hodson & Dhont, 2015), as well as a terrorism empathy scale 
to measure the amount of empathy towards victims and perpetrators of terrorism. 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 8 
 
This study aimed to explore the association between individual differences (i.e., 
personality traits) and attitudes of empathy towards victims and perpetrators of 
terrorism. Empathy towards terrorism were measured alongside the methods and 
measures used to study prejudice (Hodson & Dhont, 2015) due to the prospective 
similarities inter-group aggression in the form of terrorism. This study examined the 
strength of individual perceptions of the competitive and dangerous nature of the world 
in relation to the attitudes towards terrorism. Additionally, it aimed to explore if these 
attitudes are also reflected through social dominance orientation, right-wing 
authoritarian views, and religiousness, because of the associations that these have 
shared with other forms of inter-group aggression such as prejudice and racism, as 
discussed above.  
Prior research demonstrates associations between prejudice and the HEXACO-
60 personality domains of Openness to experience, and Agreeableness, and there was 
the expectation that these traits would also have association with terrorism empathy in 
this study. As this was the first study of its kind, the research was exploratory, as we did 
not know what to expect. There also was an expectation to find sex differences 
consistent with prior findings for the personality measures. Although Turkey was 
chosen for the cross-country comparison due to a collaboration offer and not for any 
specific reason, we did expect to find country differences in the personality measures 
and also the empathy ratings towards terrorism. It was hypothesised that there would be 
a strong relationship between lower empathy towards perpetrators of terrorism and 
beliefs that the world is a dangerous and competitive place.  
  




Participants (N = 557) from the cross-cultural sample consisted of 314 
Australian, and 243 Turkish individuals, recruited through university participation 
portals in Australia (SONA; Western Sydney University) and Turkey (Sakarya 
University). The total sample consisted of 217 men, 339 women, and 1 participant from 
the Turkish sample who identified their gender as “Other”. This participant was 
included in the final dataset, however, was not included in sex-specific analyses.  
The study was advertised to undergraduate psychology students as “The Role of 
Personality in the Processing of News Stories”. The project design required diversity of 
ages, ethnicity, and large sample size for the generalizability of results. Course credit 
was granted to Australian participants upon study completion. Australian and Turkish 
sample participants were placed in a draw to win a gift voucher of $50 and $100 value. 
This project used $3,000 funding available to HDR students at Western Sydney 
University with approval by the Human Research Ethics Committee (See Appendix I). 
Measures 
Broadband Personality Traits  
The HEXACO-60 model of personality structure (Ashton & Lee, 2007; See 
Appendix B) is a commonly used research tool consisting of six factors; Honesty-
Humility (H), Emotionality (E), Extraversion (X), Agreeableness (A), 
Conscientiousness (C), and Openness to Experience (O). This validated self-report scale 
provides broad information on personality factors, and was used in prior research 
examining the relationship between these individual differences and other forms of 
inter-group aggression such as prejudice (Hodson & Dhont, 2015). It is a shorter version 
of the full HEXACO Personality Inventory (Ashton & Lee, 2004), consisting of 10 
items for each of the six scale constructs. The HEXACO-60 reports high convergent 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 10 
 
correlations between observer reports and self-report, which average above .50, and is 
recommended to use for personality assessment with limited administration time 
(Ashton & Lee, 2007).  
Internal consistency for each of the subscales was tested via Cronbach’s alpha, 
and grouped frequency distributions for each of the scale domains was also tested.1 The 
scale domains were as follows; Honesty-Humility (M = 3.57, α = .69, SE = 0.03) 
normally distributed, with skewness of -0.25 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of -0.04 (SE = 
0.21); Emotionality (M = 3.29, α = .73, SE = 0.03) normally distributed with skewness 
of -0.12 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of -0.27 (SE = 0.21); Extraversion (M = 3.28, α = .80, 
SE = 0.03) normally distributed with skewness of -0.16 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of -
0.22 (SE = 0.20); Agreeableness (M = 3.20, α = .67, SE = 0.02) normally distributed 
with skewness of -0.15 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of 0.32 (SE = 0.21); Conscientiousness 
(M = 3.48, α = .71, SE = 0.02) normally distributed with skewness of -0.10 (SE = 0.10) 
and kurtosis of -0.25 (SE = 0.21); and Openness to Experience (M = 3.41, α = .71, SE = 
0.03) normally distributed with skewness of -0.12 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of -0.21 (SE 
= 0.21). All probability distributions were platykurtic. The items from each of the 
domains were averaged to create an overall score for each of these six respective 
subscale domains.  
The Short Dark Triad scale (SD3; Jones & Paulhus, 2014) provides information 
on how strongly individuals may reflect traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and 
subclinical psychopathy. The SD3 has previously been used in conjunction with other 
self-report scales used in this study (Jonason, 2015; Zeigler-Hill, Besser, & Marcus, 
2017). Participants were asked to rate their agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = 
strongly agree) with statements such as “People see me as a natural leader”, and “It’s 
                                                          
1 On average, there was no problematic skew (Saverage = -1.96), although the scales had overall slightly 
platykurtic probability distribution (Kaverage = -0.29). Values between -2 and +2 are considered acceptable 
to prove normal univariate distribution (George & Mallery, 2010). Thus, analysis proceeded with 
parametric tests.  
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true that I can be mean to others” (See Appendix C). The grouped frequency 
distributions for each of the scale domains were platykurtic. Machiavellianism was 
normally distributed with skewness of -0.17 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of -0.02 (SE = 
0.21); narcissism was normally distributed with skewness of -0.04 (SE = 0.10) and 
kurtosis of 0.22 (SE = 0.21); and psychopathy was normally distributed with skewness 
of 0.34 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of -0.42 (SE = 0.21). Internal consistency was 
calculated through Cronbach’s alpha; items were then averaged to create an overall 
score of narcissism (α = .72), Machiavellianism (α = .76), and psychopathy (α = .74).   
Worldviews 
Beliefs in the dangerous (BDW; Altemeyer, 1988) and competitive nature of the 
world (BCW; Altemeyer, 1988) are scales previously used to measure worldviews in 
relation to contexts such as racism (Jonason, 2015), and prejudice (Hodson & Dhont, 
2015). Beliefs that the world is a dangerous place were measured using a 10-item scale 
(Altemeyer, 1998). Previous studies report an α coefficient of .88 for the belief in a 
dangerous world scale (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). Participants were asked to rate their 
agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) to statements such as “Any day 
now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All the signs are pointing to it”, and 
“There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure 
meanness, for no reason at all” (See Appendix F). Higher scores indicate greater beliefs 
that the world is a dangerous place. The grouped frequency distributions for this scale 
showed it had platykurtic distribution with skewness of -0.72 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis 
of 1.07 (SE = 0.21). Internal consistency for the scale items was calculated with 
Cronbach’s alpha (α = .78). The items were then averaged to create an overall score of 
dangerous world beliefs.  
Belief in the competitive nature of the world was measured using a 10-item scale 
(Duckitt & Fischer, 2003), including questions such as “Basically people are objects to 
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be quietly and coolly manipulated for one’s own benefit”, and “There is really no such 
thing as “right” and “wrong”. It all boils down to what you can get away with”. 
Participants were asked to rate their agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly 
agree); higher scores indicating greater beliefs that the world is a competitive place (See 
Appendix F). The grouped frequency distributions for the scale showed this scale had 
platykurtic distribution with skewness of 0.08 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of -0.24 (SE = 
0.21). Internal consistency of the scale items was measured with Cronbach’s alpha (α = 
.70). The items were averaged into an overall score of Belief in a Competitive World.  
The Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981) is a validated 
measure of conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression. It 
is powerful in providing information to infer ideological, political, and intergroup 
phenomena (Altemeyer, 1988). The scale is commonly used in research of attitudes 
relating to prejudice (Hodson & Dhont, 2015), and even terrorism (Stitka, Bauman, 
Aramovich, & Morgan, 2010). It has also previously been used in personality research 
with Australian samples (Jonason, 2015). The 12-item scale included statements such as 
“Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn”, 
and “What our country really needs instead of more "civil rights", is a good stiff dose of 
law and order” (See Appendix D). Participants were asked to rate their agreement (1 = 
strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) with these statements. The grouped frequency 
distributions for the scale showed platykurtic distribution with skewness of -0.19 (SE = 
0.10) and kurtosis of -0.15 (SE = 0.21). Internal consistency for the items in this scale 
was calculated with Cronbach’s alpha (α = .76). The 12 items were averaged into an 
overall score of right-wing authoritarianism.  
The Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & 
Malle, 1994) is a validated tool measuring attitudes pertaining to the extent of an 
individual’s desire for their in-group to dominate and be superior to outgroup members 
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(Pratto et al., 1994). The ten items derived from the full scale used in this study included 
questions such as “Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups”, and 
“Inferior groups should stay in their place” (See Appendix E). Participants were asked to 
rate their agreement (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) with these statements. 
The short version of the scale has previously been used in studies measuring its association 
with perceived threats to participant worldview, which report an α coefficient of .80 
(Dickitt & Fisher, 2003). The grouped frequency distributions for the scale showed 
platykurtic distribution with skewness of -0.17 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of -0.74 (SE = 
0.21). Internal consistency for items of this scale was measured with Cronbach’s alpha (α 
= .82). The ten items were averaged into an overall score of social dominance 
orientation. 
Religiousness was measured using a five item scale which has previously been 
used in research on discrimination and attitudes (Strosser, Jonason, Lawson, Reid, & 
Vittum-Jones, 2016). Participants were asked to rate their agreement (1 = strongly 
disagree; 5 = strongly agree) with statements such as “I am a religious/spiritual 
person”, and “I pray very often” (See Appendix A). Higher scores indicate high 
religiousness and devotion to the individual’s religious practice. Grouped frequency 
distributions of the scale showed platykurtic distribution with skewness of -0.12 (SE = 
0.10) and kurtosis of -1.17 (SE = 0.21). Internal consistency for the scale items was 
calculated with Cronbach’s alpha (α = .93). The five items were averaged to create an 
overall score of Religiousness.  
Empathy towards Terrorism  
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there are no scales to specifically 
measure attitudes of empathy towards victims or perpetrators of terrorism. However, 
there are previously used measures of individual empathy towards victims and 
perpetrators of crimes (Smith & Frieze, 2003). The empathy scale used in this study was 
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developed in two stages, first by selecting scale items with higher levels of internal 
consistency Cronbach’s alpha among the original scale items (i.e., α < .60) from the 
empathy towards victims and perpetrators of crimes scale (Smith & Frieze, 2003). Next, 
the question items were further with consideration to conceptual validity for measuring 
terrorism empathy. The final 10 items assessed self-reported empathy levels towards 
both victims and perpetrators of terrorism (See Appendix G). Participants rated the 
degree to which they agree (1 = disagree strongly; 5 = agree strongly) to statements 
such as “I can understand how helpless a terrorist attack victim might feel”, and “I can 
empathize with the helplessness and fear a terror victim feels after a terror attack” (i.e., 
victim empathy); as well as “I can understand how powerful a terrorist might feel”, and 
“I imagine the anger a person would feel at being accused of terrorism” (i.e., perpetrator 
empathy). Thus, the adapted Terrorism Empathy scales measured the overall tolerance 
for terrorism through rating empathy that participants express towards perpetrators of 
terrorism (i.e., perpetrator empathy), and victims of terrorism (i.e., victim empathy). 
Steps were taken to analyse the internal consistency reliability of the scale items, 
through within-article as well as between-article testing for Cronbach’s alpha. These 
steps taken have been discussed below.  
Turkish Sample 
Internal consistency within the five empathy question items for the Turkish 
sample, within each of the three articles that participants saw was tested, for both 
victims (Article 1, α = .89; Article 2, α = .90; Article 3, α = .89), and perpetrators 
(Article 1, α = .87; Article 2, α = .87; Article 3, α = .87) of terrorism.  First, these items 
were averaged into a single score of Victim Empathy and Perpetrator Empathy, for each 
article respectively. Second, an analysis of variance showed no significant difference 
between the three empathy responses sampled for both victim empathy, F(2, 486) = 
2.02, p > .05, as well as perpetrator empathy, F(2, 486) = 0.89, p > .05. Third, internal 
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consistency between the three averaged scores of each article for both victim (α = .95), 
and perpetrator empathy (α = .96) was calculated. Fourth, the three averaged scores 
were then further averaged to create an overall index of Victim Empathy and 
Perpetrator Empathy for the Turkish sample. 
Australian Sample 
To overcome the methodological issue of a randomisation error described 
below, empathy responses were randomly selected from only one of the stimulus 
articles collected from the Australian sample. Even if participants provided three full 
responses to empathy items after presentation of all three articles, only one of these 
responses was randomly selected for analysis. First, internal consistency tests were run 
to assess reliability of the five question items from within each of the victim and 
perpetrator empathy scales by calculating Cronbach’s alpha for both victims (α = .86) 
and perpetrator (α = .85) empathy scores. Second, an analysis of variance showed no 
significant difference between the three empathy responses (i.e., after reading Article 1, 
Article 2, and Article 3) for both victim empathy, F(2, 310) = 2.14, p > .05, as well as 
perpetrator empathy, F(2, 310) = 0.02, p > .05 within the Australian sample. Third, the 
individual question items were averaged into an overall index of Victim Empathy and 
Perpetrator Empathy.  
The grouped frequency distributions for overall Victim Empathy showed 
platykurtic distribution with skewness of -1.22 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of 1.92 (SE = 
0.21). The grouped frequency distributions for overall Perpetrator Empathy also showed 
platykurtic distribution with skewness of -0.03 (SE = 0.10) and kurtosis of -0.75 (SE = 
0.21).  
Design 
This study was exploratory as the objective is to provide information about a 
relatively unstudied area. It consisted of multiple measures of individual differences and 
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attitudes. These individual differences and attitudes were derived from self-report scales 
measuring individual differences of broadband personality traits (i.e., HEXACO-60, 
SD3), and narrowband personality traits (i.e., worldviews). The study was administered 
to the Turkish participants in Turkish. The previously validated Turkish translation of 
the Short Dark Triad (SD3) was used (Özsoy, Rauthmann, Jonason, & Ardıç, 2017), 
however, the remaining scales needed translation for the Turkish sample.  
The native Turkish-speaking researcher and two independent academic research 
assistants from Turkey completed translations of the survey. The two independent 
Turkish research assistants were also fluent in English. This was then checked by back-
translating to assess conceptual equivalence. This also involved adjusting syntax of the 
statements to avoid awkward phrases, as direct translations of English to Turkish 
involved consideration for conceptual equivalence to the original scales (Hilton & 
Skrutkowski, 2002). For the translations to uphold conceptual and semantic 
equivalence, colloquial phrasing was used. Minor final adjustments made to the Turkish 
translations on a few items after translating them back into English encapsulated the 
fuller semantic equivalence from the original English question items. After this, the 
researcher and a third independent academic from Turkey (who was also fluent in 
English) discussed all translations to decide on the fixed translations for each scale 
items. The current study uses final items for each scale translated after these changes 
and complete agreement among the translators that the final version were indeed 
conceptually equivalent to the original English scales. The news articles about terror 
attacks in Istanbul that participants viewed before answering the empathy questions 
were obtained from real news sources in Turkey rather than translating real news 
articles from Australia, in order of also maintaining conceptual equivalence.   
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Procedure 
Participants completed the online study with a link to Qualtrics. Upon activation 
of the survey links, the study displayed the following “Warning: this hit may contain 
confronting content, participant discretion is advised”. After clicking the link, the 
following information was displayed: “This study is investigating individual differences 
and attitudes in relation to real news articles about terrorism. Several of these images 
will contain explicit real-news stories on terrorist attacks that have recently occurred in 
Turkey. If you object to viewing such articles, you should not participate in this study”. 
Participants were then required to view the participant information sheet and complete 
their consent, reminding them that their submissions will remain anonymous. The study 
was administered only after participants agreed to continue after giving consent 
following three warnings informing participants that they may be exposed to 
confronting material. Participants had ample opportunity to withdraw from the study if 
they did not wish to be exposed to such articles after all three of these steps. 
First, participants were asked to complete demographic questions (i.e., age, sex, 
working status, marital status, ethnicity, religion) and religiousness (Strosser et al., 
2016; See Appendix A). Second, participants completed randomized personality 
measures of the HEXACO-60 (Ashton & Lee, 2007; See Appendix B), and the Short 
Dark Triad (Jones & Paulhus, 2014; See Appendix C). Third, participants completed 
randomized questions probing for attitudes towards right-wing authoritarianism 
(Altemeyer, 1981; See Appendix D), social dominance orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999; See Appendix E), belief in a competitive world, and belief in a dangerous world 
(Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; See Appendix F).  
Participants then viewed a series of three real news articles taken from 
Australian news sources (See Appendix H) for the Australian sample, and Turkish news 
sources for the Turkish sample (See Appendix G). The study software used rotated the 
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order of presentation of these articles. Participants rated their empathy towards both 
victims and perpetrators of terrorism directly after viewing each of the three articles 
(See Appendix H). This was a unique way of gaining access to people’s attitudes 
towards terrorism and terrorists. The question items from both scales of victim and 
perpetrator empathy were combined and randomly presented to participants.  
However, there were issues experienced with the rotation of these articles in the 
Australian sample. Participants from the Turkish sample viewed all three randomised 
articles, and thus provided empathy scores for victims and perpetrators three times. Due 
to a forced response feature in Qualtrics that was not applied to the survey for the 
Australian sample, the study software did not carry out the rotation of articles for some 
participants of the Australian sample. All participants from the Australian sample 
provided scores of empathy after reading at least one article, however, only a small 
percentage of the Australian sample provided empathy scores twice or three times. 
Thus, each Turkish sample participant provided three separate responses of empathy 
towards victims and perpetrators of terrorism using the same items. Each Australian 
sample participant provided responses to the five question items for empathy towards 
victims and perpetrators of terrorism, at least once.  
The original reason for using three rotated articles with randomised empathy 
scale questions was to produce three separate (repeated measures) scores, to be able to 
test between- and within-measure scale reliability. The original intentions were to 
produce a single overall summed score of empathy towards victims and perpetrators of 
terrorism, if there was sufficient internal consistency for this to be acceptable. The steps 
taken to overcome this have been outlined above for each cross-country sample. Internal 
consistency reliability for within- and between-article scale items were conducted. This 
still allowed for averaging items into an overall index of Victim Empathy and 
Perpetrator Empathy after testing for internal consistency.   
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Results 
Sex and Country Effects 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and sex differences. Men scored higher on 
the Dark Triad traits than women. Men also scored higher on Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, Religiousness, and Belief in a 
Competitive World than women. Women scored higher in Honesty-Humility, 
Emotionality, and Conscientiousness than men. Women also reported higher scores of 
Victim Empathy than men. There was no difference between men and women on 
Perpetrator Empathy, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Openness to Experience, and Belief 
in a Dangerous World.  
Table 2 contains the country level differences in the individual difference 
measures between Australia and Turkey. Turkish participants were higher on 
Narcissism, Machiavellianism, Psychopathy, Social Dominance Orientation, 
Religiousness, Belief in a Dangerous World, and Belief in a Competitive World, than 
the Australian participants were. Australian participants scored higher in Emotionality, 
Victim Empathy, and Perpetrator Empathy than Turkish participants. There were no 
differences between Australian and Turkish participants on Honesty-Humility, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to Experience, and Right-
Wing Authoritarianism.  
A 2 × 2 (Country × Sex) between-groups ANOVA was performed on all the 
scales to see if there were interaction effects.2 There was a significant interaction effect 
for Emotionality F(1, 552) = 4.48, p < .05, ηp² = .01, between Australian women (M = 
3.56, SD = 0.58), and Turkish women (M = 3.36, SD = 0.61), t(337) = 2.94, p < .01, d = 
0.33. There also was a significant interaction effect for Narcissism F(1, 552) = 8.08, p < 
.01, ηp² = .01 between Australian women (M = 2.55, SD = 0.60), and Turkish women (M 
                                                          
2 The average p-value (p = .23) for the Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance was greater than .05, 
thus the assumption of normality for homogeneity of variances was met overall in the data. 
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= 3.06, SD = 0.59), t(337) = 7.36, p < .001, d = -0.86; as well as between Australian 
men (M = 2.86, SD = 0.61), and Turkish men (M = 3.07, SD = 0.51), t(215) = 2.74 , p < 
.01, d = -0.37.  
There was a significant interaction effect for Right-Wing Authoritarianism, F(1, 
552) = 4.12, p < .05, ηp² = .00, however this dropped out when sex differences for 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism was factored by country. The sex differences for Right-
Wing Authoritarianism was only significant within the Turkish sample, between 
Turkish men (M = 2.76, SD = 0.54) and Turkish women (M = 2.49, SD = 0.60), t(240) = 
3.63, p < .001, d = 0.47. It must be noted, however, that this and the above interactions 
were small in size, except for the country and sex interaction for Narcissism, suggesting 
that they account for a minor amount of cross-sex and cross-national differences in 
personality.  
Correlations and Moderations 
Table 3 contains correlations between the distal traits and the proximal traits in 
relation to the empathy scales. Higher Victim Empathy was associated with higher 
levels of Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience. Lower Victim Empathy was associated 
with higher levels of Narcissism, Psychopathy, Social Dominance Orientation, and 
Belief in a Competitive World. Lower Perpetrator Empathy was associated with higher 
levels of Narcissism, Honesty-Humility, Belief in a Dangerous World, and 
Religiousness.  
Next, moderation by sex and country was assessed using Fisher’s z test.3 There 
were minimal moderation effects overall, with only 10% of the sex, and 14% of the 
country moderated correlations differing. There seems to be more empathy differences 
                                                          
3 Fisher’s z scores were calculated using Preacher, K. J. (2002, May). Calculation for the test of the 
difference between two independent correlation coefficients [Computer software]. Available 
from http://quantpsy.org. 
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on the country level, with the significant ones reported in the spirit of disclosure. First, 
sex moderations (see Table 4) determined whether these correlations differed in men 
and women. The correlation between Victim Empathy and Machiavellianism was larger 
in men than it was in women. The correlation between Victim Empathy and 
Emotionality was larger in women than it was in men. The correlation between 
Perpetrator Empathy and Machiavellianism was larger in men than it was in women.  
Second, country moderations (see Table 5) determined whether these 
correlations differed in Australia and Turkey. The correlation between Victim Empathy 
and Psychopathy was larger in Australian participants than it was in Turkish 
participants. The correlation between Victim Empathy and Emotionality was larger in 
Australian participants than it was in Turkish participants. The correlation between 
Victim Empathy and Social Dominance Orientation was larger in Australian 
participants than it was in Turkish participants. The correlation between Victim 
Empathy and Belief in a Competitive World was larger in Australian participants than 
in Turkish participants.  
Mediation of Terrorism Empathy 
Given the correlations and sex differences, mediation tests were conducted 
where (1) the dependent variables and mediator had significant sex differences and (2) 
the mediators were correlated with the dependent variables (Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
This allows for tests of how personality traits and worldviews account for sex 
differences in empathy towards terrorism. The results of the mediation analyses are 
presented in Table 6.  
To understand what is behind the sex differences in Victim Empathy, 
personality traits were treated as potential mediators (i.e., confounders) in a series of 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression models where Step 1 contained participant’s sex. 
When examining individual differences in Victim Empathy, sex alone accounted for 4% 
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(F(1, 554) = 24.86, p < .001) of the total variance. When paired with the personality 
traits of Narcissism, Honesty-Humility, Conscientiousness, Emotionality, Psychopathy, 
Social Dominance Orientation, Belief in a Competitive World, the total model 
accounted for 16% (F(8, 547) = 13.33, p < .001) of the variance in Victim Empathy. 
The residuals of Narcissism (β = .08, t = 1.62, p > .05), Honesty-Humility (β = -.02, t = 
-0.43, p > .05), Conscientiousness (β = .05, t = 1.19, p > .05), and psychopathy (β = -
.09, t = -1.65, p > .05), dropped out of the model in Step 2 after accounting for the 
shared variance. The residuals of Emotionality (β = .14, t =3.10, p < .01), Social 
Dominance Orientation (β = -.12, t = -2.41, p <.05), and Belief in a Competitive World 
(β = -.19, t = -3.50, p < .01), remained significant after accounting for the shared 
variance the traits have with sex. This begged the further question of by how much 
these personality traits individually account for variability in Victim Empathy between 
men and women. 
The sex difference in Victim Empathy (Step 1; β = .21, t = 4.99, p < .001) was 
partially mediated (Step 2; β = .14, t = 3.07, p < .01) when Emotionality was added in 
Step 2 (∆R² = .03, p < .001), and the residual of Emotionality (β = .18, t = 3.97, p < 
.001) remained significant. The sex difference in Victim Empathy (Step 1; β = .21, t = 
4.99, p < .001) was also partially mediated (Step 2; β = .12, t = 2.87, p < .01) when 
Social Dominance Orientation was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .06, p < .001), and the 
residual of Social Dominance Orientation (β = -.26, t = -5.97, p < .001) remained 
significant. The sex difference in Victim Empathy (Step 1; β = .21, t = 4.99, p < .001) 
was also partially mediated (Step 2; β = .14, t = 3.54, p < .001) when Belief in a 
Competitive World was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .08, p < .001), and the residual of Belief 
in a Competitive World (β = -.30, t = -7.31, p < .001) remained significant. 
To understand the nature of the country difference in Victim Empathy, 
personality traits were treated as potential mediators (i.e., confounders) in a series of 
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Hierarchical Multiple Regression models where Step 1 contained participant’s country. 
When examining individual differences in Victim Empathy, country alone accounted 
for 4% (F(1, 554) = 19.81, p < .001) of the total variance, and when paired the 
personality traits of Emotionality, Belief in a Competitive World, Narcissism, 
Psychopathy, and Social Dominance Orientation, the model accounted for 16% (F(6, 
549) = 17.67, p <.001) of the variance in Victim Empathy. All personality traits 
remained as significant residuals after the shared variance in the traits between countries 
was accounted for. The predictors remained as Narcissism (β = .10, t = 2.21, p < .05), 
Psychopathy (β = -.10, t = -2.08, p < .05), Emotionality (β = .15, t = 3.54, p < .001), 
Social Dominance Orientation (β = -.11, t = -2.01, p < .05) and Belief in a Competitive 
World (β = -.19, t = -3.73, p < .001). This begged the further question of by how much 
these personality traits individually account for variability in Victim Empathy between 
Turkey and Australia. 
The country difference in Victim Empathy (Step 1; β = -.19, t = -4.45, p < .001) 
was partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.15, t = -3.49, p < .01) when Emotionality was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .04, p < .001), and the residual of Emotionality (β = .20, t = 4.85, 
p < .001) remained significant. The country difference in Victim Empathy was also 
partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.12, t = -2.97, p < .01) when Belief in a Competitive 
World was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .09, p < .001), and the residual of Belief in a 
Competitive World (β = -.30, t = -7.40, p < .001) remained significant.  
The country difference in Victim Empathy was not mediated (Step 2; β = -.18, t 
= -3.92, p < .001) when Narcissism was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .00, p = .47). The 
country difference in Victim Empathy was partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.13, t = -
3.08, p < .01) when Psychopathy was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .06, p < .001), and the 
residual of Psychopathy (β = -.24, t = -5.84, p < .001) remained significant. The country 
difference in Victim Empathy was fully mediated (Step 2; β = -.06, t = -1.30, p = .19) 
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when Social Dominance Orientation was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .06, p < .001), and the 
residual of Social Dominance Orientation (β = -.27, t = -5.82, p < .001) remained 
significant.  
To understand the nature of the country difference in Perpetrator Empathy, 
personality traits were treated as potential mediators (i.e., confounders) in a series of 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression models where Step 1 contained participant’s country. 
When examining individual differences in Perpetrator Empathy, country alone 
accounted for 6% (F(1, 554) = 34.87, p < .001) of the variance in Perpetrator Empathy, 
and when paired with the personality traits of Narcissism, Religiousness, and Belief in a 
Dangerous World, the model accounted for 9% (F(4, 551) = 13.11, p < .001) of the 
variance in Perpetrator Empathy. The residuals of Narcissism (β = -.01, t = -0.28, p > 
.05) and Religiousness (β = -.02, t = -0.40, p > .05) were not significant in Step 2 and 
thus dropped out of the model, with the residual of Belief in a Dangerous World (β = -
.18, t = -3.90, p < .001) remaining significant after accounting for the shared variance 
with Perpetrator Empathy.  
Further mediation analysis was then conducted to find by how the personality 
trait of Belief in a Dangerous World accounted for variability in Perpetrator Empathy 
between Turkey and Australia. The country difference in Perpetrator Empathy (Step 1; 
β = -.24, t = -5.91, p < .001), was partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.17, t = -3.80, p < 
.001) when Belief in a Dangerous World was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .03, p < .001), and 
the residual of Belief in a Dangerous World (β = -.18, t = -4.06, p < .001) remained 
significant. 
Auxiliary Mediation Analyses of the Dark Triad traits  
In addition, auxiliary analyses were also conducted to attempt to understand 
what might account for sex and country differences in the Dark Triad traits (see Table 
7). As these are considered distal personality traits, we opted to understand variance in 
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them through the lens of the lower-order, proximal traits. That is, we tested whether sex 
differences in, for example, psychopathy, were a function of individual differences in, 
for example, social dominance orientation. 
Sex Differences in Narcissism 
The sex difference in Narcissism (Step 1; β = -.22, t = -5.23, p < .001) was 
partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.15, t = -3.67, p < .001) when Honesty-Humility was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .09, p < .001), and the residual of Honesty-Humility (β = -.31, t 
= -7.71, p < .001) remained significant. The sex difference in Narcissism was also 
partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.14, t = -3.09, p < .01) when Emotionality was added in 
Step 2 (∆R² = .03, p < .001), with the residual of Emotionality (β = -.20, t = -4.54, p < 
.001) remaining significant. The sex difference in Narcissism was also partially 
mediated (Step 2; β = -.11, t = -2.53, p < .05) when Social Dominance Orientation was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .10, p < .001), with the residual of Social Dominance (β = .34, t 
= 8.10, p < .001) remaining significant.  
The sex difference in Narcissism was also partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.17, t 
= -4.11, p < .001) when Belief in a Competitive World was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .05, 
p < .001), with the residual of Belief in a Competitive World (β = .22, t = 5.26, p < 
.001) remaining significant. The sex difference in Narcissism was also partially 
mediated (Step 2; β = -.19, t = -4.65, p < .001) when Religiousness was added to Step 2 
(∆R² = .07, p < .001), with the residual of Religiousness (β = .15, t = 3.71, p < .001) 
remaining significant.  
Sex Differences in Machiavellianism 
The sex difference in Machiavellianism (Step 1; β = -.24, t = -5.79, p < .001) 
was partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.16, t = -4.12, p < .001) when Honesty-Humility 
was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .11, p < .001), with the residual of Honesty-Humility (β = -
.34, t = -8.56, p < .001) remaining significant. The sex difference in Machiavellianism 
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was also partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.20, t = -4.47, p < .001) when Emotionality 
was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .00, p < .05), with the residual of Emotionality (β = -.10, t = 
-2.19, p < .05) remaining significant. The sex difference in Machiavellianism was also 
partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.22, t = -5.42, p < .001) when Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .01, p < .01), with the residual of Right-
Wing Authoritarianism (β = .12, t = 2.89, p < .01) remaining significant.  
The sex difference in Machiavellianism was also partially mediated (Step 2; β = 
-.10, t = -2.53, p < .05) when Social Dominance Orientation was added in Step 2 (∆R² = 
.15, p < .001), with the residual of Social Dominance Orientation (β = .42, t = 10.38, p < 
.001) remaining significant. The sex difference in Machiavellianism was also partially 
mediated (Step 2; β = -.14, t = -3.75, p < .001) when Belief in a Competitive World was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .20, p < .001), with the residual of Belief in a Competitive World 
(β = .46, t = 12.34, p < .001) remaining significant. The sex difference in 
Machiavellianism was also partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.21, t = -5.20, p < .001) 
when Religiousness was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .03, p < .001), with the residual of 
Religiousness (β = .16, t = 3.84, p < .001) remaining significant. 
Sex Differences in Psychopathy 
The sex difference in Psychopathy (Step 1; β = -.30, t = -7.30, p < .001) was 
partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.21, t = -5.56, p < .001) when Honesty-Humility was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .13, p < .001), with the residual of Honesty-Humility (β = -.38, t 
= -9.74, p < .001) remaining significant. The sex difference in Psychopathy was also 
partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.21, t = -4.95, p < .001) when Emotionality was added 
in Step 2 (∆R² = .04, p < .001), with the residual of Emotionality (β = -.21, t = -4.77, p < 
.001) remaining significant. The sex difference in Psychopathy was also partially 
mediated (Step 2; β = -.28, t = -6.94, p < .001) when Right-Wing Authoritarianism was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .01, p < .01), with the residual of Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
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(β = .11, t = 2.73, p < .01) remaining significant. The sex difference in Psychopathy was 
also partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.17, t = -4.25, p < .001) when Social Dominance 
Orientation was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .13, p < .001), with the residual of Social 
Dominance Orientation (β = .38, t = 9.66, p < .001) remaining significant.  
The sex difference in Psychopathy was also partially mediated (Step 2; β = -.19, 
t = -5.34, p < .001) when Belief in a Competitive World was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .23, 
p < .001), with the residual of Belief in a Competitive World (β = .49, t = 13.46, p < 
.001) remaining significant. The sex difference in Psychopathy was not mediated (Step 
2; β = -.29, t = -6.98, p < .001) when Religiousness was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .00, p = 
.12), and thus Religiousness dropped out as a mediator (β = .06, t = 1.55, p = .12) for 
sex differences in Psychopathy.  
Country Differences in Narcissism 
The country difference in Narcissism (Step 1; β = .35, t = 8.69, p < .001) was 
partially mediated (Step 2; β = .31, t = 7.72, p < .001) when Emotionality was added in 
Step 2 (∆R² = .04, p < .001), with the residual of Emotionality (β = -.20, t = -4.88, p < 
.001) remaining significant. The country difference in Narcissism was also partially 
mediated (Step 2; β = .22, t = 5.02, p < .001) when Social Dominance Orientation was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .06, p < .001), with the residual of Social Dominance Orientation 
(β = .27, t = 6.13, p < .001) remaining significant. The country difference in Narcissism 
was partially mediated (Step 2; β = .31, t = 7.64, p < .001) when Belief in a Competitive 
World was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .03, p < .001), with the residual of Belief in a 
Competitive World (β = .19, t = 4.72, p < .001) remaining significant.  
The country difference in Narcissism was not significantly mediated (Step 2; β = 
.36, t = 8.18, p < .001) when Belief in a Dangerous World was added in Step 2 (∆R² = 
.00, p = .53), and thus Belief in a Dangerous World dropped out as a mediator of 
country differences in Narcissism. The country difference in Narcissism also was not 
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significantly mediated (Step 2; β = .32, t = 7.48, p < .001) when Religiousness was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .00, p = .21), and thus Religiousness also dropped out as a 
mediator of country differences in Narcissism. 
Country Differences in Machiavellianism 
The country difference in Machiavellianism (Step 1; β = .36, t = 9.05, p < .001) 
was partially mediated (Step 2; β = .34, t = 8.38, p < .001) when Emotionality was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .01, p < .01), with the residual of Emotionality (β = -.11, t = -
2.74, p < .01) remaining significant. The country difference in Machiavellianism was 
partially mediated (Step 2; β = .19, t = 4.47, p < .001) when Social Dominance 
Orientation was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .10, p < .001), with the residual of Social 
Dominance Orientation (β = .36, t = 8.51, p < .001) remaining significant. The country 
difference in Machiavellianism was partially mediated (Step 2; β = .27, t = 7.35, p < 
.001) when Belief in a Competitive World was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .18, p < .001), 
with the residual of Belief in a Competitive World (β = .44, t = 12.02, p < .001) 
remaining significant.  
The country difference in Machiavellianism was not significantly mediated 
(Step 2; β = .34, t = 7.74, p < .001) when Belief in a Dangerous World was added in 
Step 2 (∆R² = .00, p = .20), and thus Belief in a Dangerous World dropped out as a 
mediator of country differences in Machiavellianism. The country difference in 
Machiavellianism also was not significantly mediated (Step 2; β = .34, t = 7.77, p < 
.001) when Religiousness was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .00, p = .18), and thus 
Religiousness dropped out as a mediator of country differences in Machiavellianism. 
Country Differences in Psychopathy 
The country difference in Psychopathy (Step 1; β = .24, t = 5.71, p < .001) was 
partially mediated (Step 2; β = .19, t = 4.55, p < .001) when Emotionality was added in 
Step 2 (∆R² = .06, p < .001), with the residual of Emotionality (β = -.26, t = -6.26, p < 
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.001) remaining significant. The country difference in Psychopathy was partially 
mediated (Step 2; β = .13, t = 3.53, p < .001) when Belief in a Competitive World was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .24, p = .001), with the residual of Belief in a Competitive World 
(β = .50, t = 13.64, p < .001) remaining significant. The country difference in 
Psychopathy was fully mediated (Step 2; β = .04, t = 0.84, p = .40) when Social 
Dominance Orientation was added in Step 2 (∆R² = .14, p < .001), with the residual of 
Social Dominance Orientation (β = .42, t = 9.78, p < .001) remaining significant.  
The country difference in Psychopathy was not significantly mediated (Step 2; β 
= .22, t = 4.87, p < .001) when Belief in a Dangerous World was added in Step 2 (∆R² = 
.00, p = .40), and thus Belief in a Dangerous World dropped out as a mediator of 
country differences in Psychopathy. The country difference in Psychopathy also was not 
significantly mediated (Step 2; β = .23, t = 5.09, p < .001) when Religiousness was 
added in Step 2 (∆R² = .00, p = .71), and thus Religiousness dropped out as a mediator 
of country differences in Psychopathy. 
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Discussion 
Even with billions of dollars spent funding the “war on terrorism”, the problem 
of terrorism is not ceasing. Whilst in the final stages of writing this study, Las Vegas 
suffered, what has been dubbed, the “worst mass-shooting in U.S history” (Heffer, 
2017), and it was committed by a middle-aged, white, American man with no apparent 
motive. Although the traditional definition of “terrorists” is individuals who engage in 
political or religious violence, derived from varying amounts of external influence and 
context as opposed to external command (Feldman, 2013), it remains unclear how this 
seemingly quiet, retired accountant could become the “worst mass-shooter” of America 
as there still is no clear motive identified by police. Prior to conducting this study there 
seemed a severe lack of empirical evidence on the relationship between personality 
factors and attitudes related to intergroup aggression and violence which might 
perpetuate terrorism (Feldman, 2013), and recent events accentuate the need for this 
shift because of the relevance of the mass-shooter’s personality. The most recent mass-
shooting also brings the heterogeneity of terrorists to attention and is consistent with the 
aims of this study towards considering the individual differences in terrorism empathy. 
The definition of terrorists also describes their state of mind as rational or 
irrational in their cognitive process of committing malevolent crime. Other theoretical 
frameworks have attempted to explain why individuals may develop such behaviours, 
including sociological theories, that attempt to explain terrorism as a cultural 
misalignment of socially learned behaviour (Phillips, 2015). Theoretical and empirical 
accounts of terrorism overall seem to fail to consider the heterogeneity of terrorists 
(Victoroff, 2005), and the most recent Las Vegas mass-shooting is consistent with this 
view of the broad definition of “terrorists” including unexpected persons who are part of 
unexpected social groups. A majority of terrorism-related studies use secondary analysis 
(i.e., analyses based on archival records; Silke, 2001) which attempt to find possible 
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clues of what made an individual commit their crimes ex post facto. Although the 
current literature offers varied accounts on possible influencing factors in the rise of 
terrorism, these do not specifically address the crucial importance of individual 
differences in relation to human behaviour, and attitudes that form as a result. Studies 
examining personality traits and attitudes towards terrorism are limited, thus, it seems 
crucial that empirical research about terrorism move towards offering information 
useful for prevention (Barros, 2003). Gauging attitudes of empathy towards terrorism 
might be one way to achieve this. Using the methods of personality psychology, this 
study assessed empathy towards both victims and perpetrators of terrorism, and then the 
associations with personality traits and worldviews in Australian and Turkish 
undergraduates.  
Overall, the results reflect a relationship between more empathy towards 
terrorism victims in individuals high in personality traits such as honesty-humility, 
emotionality, extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to 
experience, as well as less empathy towards terrorism victims in individuals high in 
personality traits such as narcissism, psychopathy, social dominance orientation, and 
belief in a competitive world. This implies that the “darker” traits are associated with 
less empathy towards terrorism victims, and the “lighter” traits are associated with more 
empathy towards terrorism victims. The results also reflect a relationship between more 
empathy towards perpetrators of terrorism in individuals low in personality traits such 
as narcissism, honesty-humility, dangerous world beliefs, and religiousness. This also 
implies that individuals low in “darker” traits are more likely to empathise with 
perpetrators of terrorism. Thus, the hypotheses that there would be a relationship 
between lower empathy towards perpetrators of terrorism in individuals with higher 
beliefs that the world is a dangerous place, was also supported. There also were sex and 
country differences in the personality traits and worldviews, which are discussed below. 
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The results from this study are consistent with the idea of those who empathise with 
terrorists as being diverse, giving further support to the theoretical description of the 
heterogeneous terrorist personality (Victoroff, 2005). 
Sex Differences 
As was expected, sex differences in the Dark Triad traits whereby men scored 
higher than women on the Dark Triad traits replicated prior research (Jonason, Li, & 
Czarna, 2013; Jonason, Li, Webster, & Schmitt, 2009). That is, men were more 
narcissistic, Machiavellian and psychopathic than women were. The sex differences 
indicate men are “darker” in personality than women in other aspects of personality as 
well; men were more right-wing authoritarian, social dominance orientated, religious, 
and believed in a competitive world, compared to women. Women were higher in 
Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, and Conscientiousness than men were. This is 
consistent with prior research from other countries as well, whereby women are higher 
in neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness than men (Schmitt, Realo, 
Voracek, & Allik, 2008). Thus, men seemed to display a “darker” personality, than the 
“lighter” personality of women in this study, and this is consistent with the past 
literature. Unsurprisingly, women reported having more empathy towards victims of 
terrorism than men, which is most likely related to their “lighter” personality traits of 
Emotionality and Conscientiousness. There was no difference between men and women 
on perpetrator empathy, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Openness to Experience, and 
dangerous world beliefs, suggesting that these may be individualistic and thus 
heterogeneous traits.  
Even with a plethora of research on sex differences in personality traits, it is 
important to consider if these traits are agentic (i.e., promoting self-advancement a 
social hierarchy) or communal (i.e., the partner concept associated with friendliness and 
positive relationship maintenance) metaconcepts (Trapnell & Paulhus, 2012). As such, 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 33 
 
traits such as low Agreeableness, low Openness to Experience, and the Dark Triad traits 
are predictors of prejudice (Hodson, Hogg, & MacInnis, 2009) and out-group 
aggression (Hodson & Dhont, 2015), meaning that they are agentic traits. With the 
expression of these prejudice out-group attitudes also comes a sense of belonging with 
an in-group, and this in itself is associated with high levels of social dominance 
orientation (Henry et al., 2005). The relationship between right-wing authoritarianism 
and social dominance orientation was strong within this study, as well as other research 
(Henry, Sidanius, Levin, & Pratto, 2005) and both traits are agentic in nature. Thus, past 
personality research into prejudice show these traits enable individuals to seek 
acceptance within the in-group majority and express negativity towards out-group 
members. However, this inter-group aggression archetype of the traits social dominance 
orientation and right-wing authoritarianism may also be extended to terrorism. Social 
dominance theory explains terrorism as a paradigm of social dominance struggles 
amongst minority and majority groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). If we consider the role 
of agentic traits as promoting self-advancement a social hierarchy, then it may explain 
the role of the traits in terrorism empathy, and also be considered an example of fast-life 
strategy.  
Life History theory is an evolutionary theory postulating that fast-life strategy 
develops in harsh and unpredictable ecologies because of an uncertain future, and that 
individuals may not live long enough to reproduce if they delay (White et al., 2013). 
Though originally making predictions about species, Life History theory has recently 
been applied to explain the manifestation of certain personality traits, including the 
Dark Triad traits (Jonason et al., 2012; McDonald, Donnellan & Navarrete, 2012). 
Specifically, the fast strategy has been closely associated with the facet of impulsive 
antisocialism in psychopathy, entitlement and exploitativeness in narcissism and 
Machiavellianism, and even aggression (McDonald et al., 2012). The Dark Triad traits 
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may, therefore, be considered agentic traits because they offer adaptive qualities in an 
evolutionary sense (Jonason et al., 2012). Considering the study results, the sex 
difference in the Dark Triad traits could therefore be a demonstration of fast life-history 
strategy in men, as it is an adaptive quality to maximise reproductive success. This is 
exemplified by research where men with higher levels of the Dark Triad traits have 
short-term relationship preferences (Jonason et al., 2009) and lower standards for these 
short-term mates which is predictive of one-night stands (Jonason et al., 2011).  
The sex differences in this study may be understood through the Life History 
theory paradigm which means that individuals with traits such as the Dark Triad traits, 
social dominance orientation, and right-wing authoritarianism, are more agentic. 
However, it could also be that the sociocultural paradigm may explain how individuals 
are a product of their environment offer an explanation as to why they display 
communal traits. Both are reasonable hypotheses, however given the cross-country 
invariance of the effects, the evolutionary psychology argument of the Life History 
theory paradigm may have more weight in this context.  
Country Differences 
The country differences revealed Turkish participants were higher in Dark Triad 
trait personalities than Australian participants, as well as lower in Emotionality. Turkish 
participants were also more social dominance orientated, religious, and believed that the 
world was both a competitive and dangerous place, than Australian participants. 
Considering the current political and socioeconomic climate in Turkey (Karpat, 2015) 
this is not surprising. Although traditionally considered undesirable, the Dark Triad 
traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy offer agentic qualities for 
individuals to be able to extract as many resources as possible from a constrained 
environment (Jonason et al., 2010). This again may be a reflection of a fast-life strategy; 
unpredictable and harsh social environments account for life history development in 
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both adolescence and young adulthood (Brumbach, Figueredo, & Ellis, 2009). Mortality 
risk and stochasticity (i.e., random pattern) environments are particular predictors of 
this. This is consistent with the current social and political environment of Turkey. 
Therefore, the results may be a reflection of an adaptive fast-life strategy in Turkish 
young adults as a product of their environment. Fast-life strategy has been closely 
associated with the Dark Triad trait of psychopathy (Jonason, Koenig, & Tost, 2010), 
which is also traditionally deemed as the most undesirable trait. However, psychopathy 
does offer advantageous qualities in some contexts.  
A lack of empathy and an unwavering drive of vengeance is a quality associated 
with success at work; so much so in fact, that self-reported higher income earners are 
higher in psychopathy than low-income earners (Howe, Falkenbach, & Massey, 2014; 
Jonason, Koehn, Okan, & O’Connor, 2018). This trait is also associated with 
individuals in leadership and managerial roles as well as high-risk positions (Lilienfield 
et al., 2014), where they are successful because of the fearless dominance these 
individuals possess. Psychopathy is also an agentic quality for short-term relationships 
and a positive predictor of reproductive success, where they are engage in risky sexual 
behaviour (Fulton, Marcus, & Payne, 2010), sexual coercion tactics (Gladden, Sisco & 
Figueredo, 2008), and mate poaching (Jonason, Li, & Buss, 2010). Although 
psychopathy is also associated with negative qualities such as aggression (Jonason et 
al., 2010) and manipulation as a means of increasing sexual access (Jones & Olderbak, 
2014), this actually is a good adaptive tactic. From an evolutionary perspective, this 
adaptive behaviour is consistent with the fast-life strategy these individuals function 
within. Thus, the psychopath is still a functioning member of society, effectively a 
successful person in different contexts such as work and sex. They are just functioning 
differently to everyone else as most individuals tend to function within the slow-life 
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strategy end of the continuum. Thus, the country difference in Dark Triad traits being 
more predominant in Turkish participants could be an adaptive, agentic advantage.  
Although evolutionary psychological theory offers explanation for the results, 
the sociocultural elements to this type of research cannot be ignored. For example, some 
facets of the personality traits of right-wing authoritarianism may be a societal 
construct, where men may learn to be this way through society (i.e., as a product of their 
environment). When comparing the political situation, it is clear that one type of 
political party is gaining momentum in all countries, across cultures and countries – the 
far right, previously dubbed as “fascism” (Rydgren, 2007). With the increase in 
terrorism instilling fear into civilisations in the West, and the East, across Europe, and 
Australia, it seems that this has had a direct impact on the rise of right-wing 
authoritarian views (Rydgren, 2007). In Europe, ethnic competition (i.e., feeling 
threatened by ethnic minorities), and social disintegration due to nationalistic pride 
seems to have role in the rise of right-wing authoritarian worldview (Werts, Scheepers, 
& Lubbers, 2012). In Britain, the increased terrorism threat has seen an acceptance in 
limitations of civil rights on minority groups in individuals with right-wing authoritarian 
worldviews (Kossowska et al., 2011). In Australia, right-wing authoritarianism has 
predicted support of the military aggression against Iraq (Crowson, 2009), and has 
entered the political arena in the form of a One-Nation political party who openly 
support the banning of Islamic immigration (i.e., Muslim immigrants). Although 
examining the rise of right-wing authoritarianism in different countries provides insight 
into why they may develop, this does not explain why we see this trend in both samples 
from this study.  
Australia and Turkey are two vastly different countries. The history of Turkey 
and the Turkish people stems back from the Ottoman times founded in the year 
1299AD, which then became the Republic of Turkey in 1922; Australia is a relatively 
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young country, formed as the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 after British 
colonisation. The religion of the two countries are also quite different; Australia is a 
multicultural, multi-faith country with the most popular faith of Christianity (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2016), whereas Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country, 
although not governed by Islamic rule. Other things that differ among the two countries 
include culture, economy, currency, geographical location to the East/West, and 
industry. Thus, it may be said that Australia and Turkey are drastically different 
countries. So why is right-wing authoritarianism also a prominent trait in the Turkish 
participants? Perhaps as sociological theories state, it may be a product of the 
environment. These such theoretical frameworks also define terrorism as bottom-up 
processes to contradict hegemonic social configurations, carried out by marginalised 
and disenfranchised individuals or groups (Boyns & Ballard, 2004).  
Although this study did not have the means to make prediction on who will 
commit acts of terrorism, it does offer insight into the personality traits associated with 
perpetrator empathy. The auxiliary analyses conducted to see if these worldviews may 
mediate Dark Triad personality traits was conducted for this reason. The trend of 
specific traits being seen across both countries sampled in this study, it may, instead, be 
that this trend is associated with fast-life strategy as a direct product of agentic 
personality traits. This is because empathy is an emotion that is associated with a slow 
life-history strategy and is also a communal trait as it predicts support of others and 
secure attachment (Glenn, Kurzban, & Raine, 2011). Thus, the country differences in 
personality traits and worldviews associated with fast life-history strategy may have 
developed for these individuals to have adaptive advantage over others in their 
environments, as opposed to being a sociocultural construct.   
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Individual Differences in Terrorism Empathy 
Victim empathy was exacerbated by certain personality traits. In men, victim 
empathy had a polarised relationship with psychopathy, social dominance orientation, 
and competitive world beliefs. Thus, men higher on psychopathy, who believed the 
world is a competitive place and were social dominance oriented had less empathy 
towards victims of terrorism. Further, men who were more narcissistic, right-wing 
authoritarian, believed in a dangerous world nature, and more religious, had less 
empathy towards perpetrators. In women, victim empathy was also exacerbated by 
higher levels of Machiavellianism, psychopathy, social dominance orientation, and 
competitive world beliefs. Women who were more religious and believed in a 
dangerous world also had less empathy towards terrorists. These traits are also seen in 
association with stronger prejudiced attitudes (Hodson & Dhont, 2015), and racism 
(Jonason, 2015), and, thus, may be traits that influence the dehumanisation effect of 
outgroup members as a way of psychological distancing. A surprising finding was the 
non-significant link between psychopathy and perpetrator empathy, as this relationship 
was an expected outcome. However, further analyses did reveal that psychopathy 
actually accounts for a considerable percentage of social dominance orientation, which 
in turn influences empathy biases towards perpetrators of terrorism. Hence, although 
individuals may not fit the measurements for sub-clinical psychopathy, this still serves 
as a tangent for being able to relate to a terrorist.  
 The country difference in the empathy ratings towards terrorism was 
interesting. Australian participants rated more empathy towards both victims and 
perpetrators of terrorism than Turkish participants. This was an unexpected result, as we 
hypothesised that psychological and physical proximity to terrorism would have the 
opposite effect – to increase empathy to victims of terrorism at the very least. The 
results may suggest a desensitisation effect could possibly have occurred in the Turkish 
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responders. Sakarya University (where the responders are situated) is south-west of 
Istanbul, the Turkish city where majority of the terrorist attacks between 2015 and 2017 
occurred.   
Dehumanisation is a psychological protective mechanism, whereby a person 
may lose their own sense of individuality as the painful or overwhelming emotions 
related to the humane treatment of others also decrease (Bernard, Ottenberg, & Redl, 
1965). This effect may also be mistaken for desensitisation, which involves a steadily 
reduced emotional reaction of empathy to terrorism after repeated exposures (Gidron, 
Gal, & Zahavi, 1999). When both occur together, it may facilitate a myriad expression 
of certain personality traits. Personality is fluid – and although most research points to 
its stable nature, certain contexts increase or decrease the presentation of certain traits. 
Combine this with a dangerous competitive nature of the surrounding environment of an 
individual, and it may well facilitate the expression of different agentic personality traits 
such as the Dark Triad. Evolutionary psychology postulates that the Dark Triad traits 
are condition-dependent adaptations, that may develop as a result of environment 
(Jonason, Icho, & Ireland, 2016). An example of this would be long-term 
dehumanisation in terms of torture (i.e., a dangerous environment). This occurs when 
individuals repeatedly exposed to dangerous environment feel both helpless and 
hopeless, which results in their dehumanisation (Haslam, 2006). There is a long solid 
history of such trauma having long-term effect on an individual’s personality (Fink, 
2003; Nickerson, Bryant, Rosebrock, & Litz, 2014; Sommier, 2002). Thus, a 
combination of dehumanisation and desensitisation could be a recipe for personality 
adaptation to the environment. In terms of the results from this study, this theological 
framework provides a distal explanation for why there was a terrorism non-bias in 
Turkish participants. Repeat exposure to terrorism incidents, and perhaps being direct or 
indirect victims themselves, could have facilitated the combined dehumanisation and 
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desensitisation effect whereby Australian participants reported significantly higher 
empathy towards both victims and perpetrators of terrorism. 
On the other hand, Australia is yet to be directly affected by a major terrorism 
incident. Even though the country remains on “high alert” for an imminent attack, this 
follows two distinct lone-wolf terrorism incidents in 2015 at the Sydney Lindt Café, and 
the Parramatta police shooting. Both incidents involved “Islamic extremism”, the first a 
controversial Muslim figure, and the second a young radicalised 15 years old boy. The 
geographical location of Australia as its own continent means it is physically distant 
from the current epicentre of terrorism incident – Europe. The results from this study 
could possibly mean that because of the isolated geographical location, and increasing 
threat of a terrorist attack, Australians have actually become more sensitised. Thus, 
empathy ratings for victims of terrorism could be higher in Australians because of their 
over sensitisation to the issue. This is one other explanation of a possible social 
desirability effect in the results. This effect is typically present in W.E.I.R.D. (i.e., 
Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic; Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010) samples, which is a limitation of the Australian sample and will be 
further discussed below with suggestions on further research direction. However, the 
empathy results could very well not be a reflection of a social desirability effect at all, 
but a representation of the sensitivity to the expectation that Australians are, 
proverbially, next in line of fire. Additionally, prior work on racism has shown a 
prevalent theme of Australians believing ethnic diversity is a threat to Australia, and 
that Muslims, Middle Easterners and Asians did not belong in Australia (Dunn et al., 
2004). If racism were to be an issue in this study, then there should have been lower 
victim empathy ratings by Australians considering the stimuli contained information 
about terrorism incidences occurring in Turkey, a country who many consider as Middle 
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Eastern. As this was not evident in the results, it can safely be said that racism was not a 
confounding factor in the study results.  
Considering a possible limitation to the victim empathy results may be a social 
desirability bias in the Australian sample, this is not present in the perpetrator empathy. 
There were negative association between perpetrator empathy and Honesty-Humility, 
dangerous world beliefs, and religiousness. These narrowband traits (as a product of 
environment) become a lot more important when considering the sociogenomic model 
of personality and how environment may influence the behaviours of an individual. 
Although these have been explained with the sociogenomic and fast-life strategy 
paradigms, to understand the role of individual differences in terrorism biases, it could 
also be examined through another perspective of collectivism. Although individuals 
may be drawn to enact certain behaviours for individual, heterogeneous reasons, with 
terrorism there is also the collective element of the group to consider. The theory of 
collective action (Olson, 1965) has been applied to the context of terrorism as an 
explanation for the group dynamic in terrorist cells. This is also a communal, not 
agentic trait, which means that individuals are involved with the group ideology because 
they believe they are contributing to a purpose. 
Although this does not align with the traditional definitions of agentic vs 
communal trait representation, it is an example of non-normative collective action. The 
two distinct pathways of collective action advise that either (a) individuals respond to 
injustices through an emotional pathway, characterised by anger, and (b) individuals 
believe they may solve issues collectively through the efficacy pathway (Tausch et al., 
2011). By applying the theoretical basis of this model to the research findings of the 
current study, the personality traits and empathy associations become more important to 
the question of what personality traits to screen for when interpreting if an individual is 
agentic, and empathises with perpetrators of terrorism, or whether they are communal in 
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their traits, and empathise with victims of terrorism. Suggestions for further research 
direction extending this line of thought are discussed in the below limitations section. 
The low correlation between Victim and Perpetrator Empathy shows that these 
two traits may act as orthogonal biases, meaning that although they work in similar 
ways as empathy measures they differ in their nature. Victim empathy is closely 
associated with communal traits such as honesty-humility, emotionality, agreeableness, 
and openness to experience, whereas perpetrator empathy is closely associated with 
agentic traits such as narcissism, dangerous world beliefs, and low honesty-humility. By 
taking this approach to the two types of empathy as orthogonal biases related to specific 
types of traits, this enables an understanding akin to knowing what drives empathy 
biases towards terrorism. Being agentic, however, does not mean that an individual will 
necessarily favour a perpetrator of terrorism over a victim in terms of their empathy. 
However, what it may mean is that they share an attitude of indifference towards them 
both. Thus, there seems no particular bias towards victims or perpetrators of terrorism in 
individuals with agentic traits. Rather, there is a neutral, cool indifference in empathy, 
and this is possibly associated with the trait of Narcissism and Psychopathy in 
particularly, within the Dark Triad traits.  
Relationship between Personality Traits and Worldviews  
Another noteworthy finding was the relationship between competitive and 
dangerous world beliefs, and personality traits. This was particularly strong within the 
Turkish sample. When considering the socioeconomic and political climate of Turkey, it 
could be that these worldviews have in turn influenced the presentation of more 
adaptive personality traits, such as the Dark Triad traits. In line with the exploitive 
nature of the Dark Triad traits and Machiavellianism in particular, this marks them less 
likely to help others unless there is the promise of a self-interest advantage (Wilson, 
Near, & Miller, 1996). An environment that is both dangerous and competitive in nature 
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can also be thought of as a dystopian society, which catalyses the necessity for agentic 
traits so that individuals may “get ahead”. However, just because the environment 
facilitates prominence of adaptive personality traits, this does not mean it is a causal 
relationship. Rather, it is a reflection of how fast-life strategy may suit individuals in 
order to have an advantage over others.  
Life History Theory addresses the allocation of time and energy in the face of 
trade-offs, to maximise their fitness; thus, minimum input for maximum output. This 
framework is also applied in an Evolutionary Psychology context, as it is concerned 
with things affecting individuals across the lifespan (Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005). In the 
context of this study, it is more difficult for an individual to take advantage of others if 
they care about them. In other words, having empathy towards a certain individual or 
group is not an advantageous trait in a competitive, dangerous world environment, 
where more agentic traits such as the Dark Triad traits offer advantageous qualities for 
maximising fitness. When we examine the pathology of Narcissists, for example, a lack 
of emotional empathy and dysfunction of cognitive empathy is its primary 
distinguishing feature in clinical populations (Baskin-Sommers, Krusemark, & 
Ronningstam, 2014). Although this quality is costly to have in long-term romantic 
relationships (Smith et al., 2014), this is advantageous in the context of empathy 
towards victims and perpetrators of crime. This is because the narcissist feels they do 
not need to behave any differently towards these individuals. Thus, minimising their 
emotional involvement maximises their fitness in the cut-throat world. Although the 
measures of the Dark Triad traits used within this study do not imply a pathology, they 
do reveal distinct implications of what possessing these traits means. Simply put, if 
individuals high on the Dark Triad traits care about people then it is harder to take 
advantage of them, and would not suit their preferred fast-life strategy.  
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This is also evident when we look at other contexts. When humans are able to 
remove the inhibition that empathy is on maximising their evolutionary fitness, we see a 
startling shift in behaviour. The most famous example of this is Zimbardo’s Sanford 
Prison Experiment (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973), which he later spoke about as 
the Lucifer Effect (Zimbardo, 2007). What seemed like a good idea at the time – to 
place non-clinical, normal people (i.e., undergraduate college students) together and 
allow them to roleplay being the authoritative figure in a prison – became an, albeit, 
shocking milestone in social psychology (Zimbardo, 1973). This has become a well-
known example of how good people can become “evil”. Even though Zimbardo 
challenges the efficacy of personality psychology as an overestimation of an 
individual’s abilities and underestimation of their environment, it still raises the 
question of what a person is actually capable of. Zimbardo (2007) argues that the 
Stanford Prison Experiment is evidence of how an individual’s environment influences 
their actions, and overrides their personality characteristics. Fast forward 50 years until 
now where the world is faced with the “war on terrorism”, and we may ask the same 
question. Is it the individual themselves who are to blame for immersing themselves 
with terrorism, or are they a product of their environment? It seems that it may actually 
be both.  
With the emergence of new biological and evolutionary research came a new 
model which integrated personality psychology and sociogenomic biology, called 
sociogenomic personality psychology (Roberts & Jackson, 2008). The model outlines 
that biological hereditary factors, and environmental factor have implications on states, 
and states have direct influence on traits. The model outlines biological factors as also 
influencing traits directly. Therefore, personality is a feature of an individual’s biology 
and significant life outcomes. If we consider the role that states have as a person’s 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviours, it may then be understood as having a dependent 
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association with both biological and environmental factors. Considering the results from 
this study, there is reason to believe that narrowband personality traits related to 
environmental factors must be taken into consideration when interpreting the role of 
broadband personality traits in terrorism.  
Although the mediation analyses revealed mostly partial mediation effects, the 
Dark Triad personality traits did explain sex differences in competitive world beliefs 
and social dominance orientation. What this could mean is that even though the Dark 
Triad traits are thought to be closely associated with the terrorist psychological profile, 
other narrowband traits such as competitive world beliefs, and social dominance 
orientation are also factors to consider. These may form because of the social 
environment surrounding the individual and hence, should be considered when 
interpreting the empathy biases towards terrorism. The full mediation that social 
dominance orientation had on psychopathy is an example of this, with country 
differences removed. Social dominance orientation alone accounted for 14% of the 
variance in the trait, between Australia and Turkey with shared country variance 
removed. Considering the sociogenomic model, this means that when country 
differences are bypassed, the longing for social dominance must have a direct effect on 
the states of an individual, before it may account for that amount of variance in the trait 
of psychopathy. So, the thoughts, behaviours, and feelings of that individual would be 
firstly influenced. This is evident in the associations between perpetrator empathy, and 
dangerous world beliefs, for example, as well as the significant association between 
social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance 
orientation and religiousness. 
Further, although religion and religiousness is popularly referred to as 
influencing factors on terrorism in mainstream media (Nacos, 2007), the results of this 
study do not support this idea. In fact, the mediation analyses revealed that religiousness 
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was insignificant in accounting for variance in the Dark Triad traits such as 
Psychopathy with both country and sex differences removed. Religiousness had no 
influence on individual differences in the Dark Triad traits, when sex and country 
differences were removed from the equation. Therefore, a person’s religiousness is not 
reason enough to believe that they will involve themselves with terrorism. However, 
there was a significant negative correlation between religiousness and perpetrator 
empathy, meaning that the more religious a person is, the less empathy they will have 
towards perpetrators of terrorism. The contrary is also true; the less religious a person is 
the more empathy they will have towards perpetrators of terrorism. There also were 
positive correlations between religiousness and right-wing authoritarianism, social 
dominance orientation, and dangerous world beliefs. Taking into account the 
sociogenomic model of personality traits (Roberts, 2009) the empathy biases may be 
understood as a reflection of how states of an individual are influenced by narrowband 
traits as a product of environmental factors, which then in turn project into the 
presentation of their personality traits. Thus, it still comes down to their broadband 
personality traits. Similarly, dark personality traits have accounted for as much as six 
times more variance in religious sinning behaviour than moral foundation (Jonason, 
Zeigler-Hill, & Okan, 2017), even more than spitefulness and sadism. This implies that 
the dark personality traits play an important role in contexts of behavioural 
dysregulation more than previously suggested by Zimbardo (2007).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the results of this study offered first insight into the individual 
differences associated with terrorism empathy on a cross-country level, the study did 
not come without limitations. As is common with research focusing on a controversial 
topic such as terrorism, the data could possibly reflect a social desirability effect. This 
could possibly be present in the empathy ratings towards victims of terrorism, not 
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towards perpetrators. This is suggested by the skew in mean empathy ratings toward 
victims of terrorism, and, thus, a social desirability bias towards victims. However, 
because of this effect not being present in the perpetrator empathy ratings, it could offer 
potential insight into why some people might be involved in terrorism when considering 
the personality factors that were associated with this. For example, individuals who are 
dishonest, less religious, narcissistic, and hold beliefs that the world is not a dangerous 
place, are more likely to empathise with terrorists. This offers a unique view into how 
people from a “normal population” may relate to terrorists, and what personality traits 
may incline them to do so. This idea supports the modern view of terrorists to be 
religiously driven as an outcome of being concerned with the dangerous and 
competitive nature of the world (Jonas & Fischer, 2006), and the results were discussed 
in this manner above.  
Considering the implications of the dehumanisation and desensitisation effect in 
Turkish participants discussed above, the next question arising is if the results would be 
different had we sampled empathy ratings from participants after presenting them with 
examples of terrorism incidents from countries other than Turkey. For example, 
presenting participants with stimuli relating to the September 11 terror attacks in the 
USA might have resulted in different findings. It could very well be the case that using 
stimuli portraying terrorism incidents from Turkey to sample empathy ratings simply 
served as a reminder for how dehumanised the Turkish victims have become. This may 
have then inadvertently accelerated the desensitisation effect in these participants. To 
overcome this possible issue, it is suggested that future research use culturally diverse 
stimuli examples of terrorism incidents that have occurred around major cities of the 
world. This change would address the issue of a possible desensitisation-increasing 
stimuli as a potential confounding factor of the empathy results, and if a replication 
occurs then it would support the research conclusions drawn from this study. 
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As mentioned in the general discussion above, social desirability effects are 
typically present in W.E.I.R.D. samples (Henrich et al., 2010), which is a limitation of 
using university undergraduate student samples even if participants are from diverse 
ethnic/cultural/socioeconomic backgrounds. As a suggestion for further study, 
measuring implicit attitudes would be one way to address the social desirability effect, 
such as use of an Implicit Association Task (Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005). These 
are commonly used in experimental studies investigating individual differences in 
racism (Oswald et al., 2013). In conjunction with explicit attitude measures, this could 
offer a broader and stronger reflection of true attitudes towards terrorism be perhaps 
asking responders to sort words that are associated with terrorism. These could include 
categorising words such as “hurt”, “bomb”, “suicide bomber”, “attack”, “agony”, 
“fear”, and so on, relating to an evaluation of “Good” or “Bad”. Rather than a reading 
task to prime the participants for questions relating to terrorism, presenting them with 
this type of implicit attitude task may be a more advanced method for gaining insight 
into terrorism biases. However, time would then be of further constraint as a longer 
participation study would also mean higher attrition rates amongst participants, or a lack 
of concentration due to participation fatigue for those who complete it.  
 Methodological differences in the empathy ratings provided by participants was 
also a limitation of this study. Although it is not believed to have tainted the results 
when considering the robust sample size and steps taken to assess the reliability of the 
data, it does pose other issues. For example, if all Australian participants had seen all 
three articles and then rated their empathy three times, as the Turkish participants did, 
would the results be different? Upon further investigation, it became clear that the issue 
was the application of a forced response in Qualtrics used in conjunction with the 
Randomization function for the Turkish study. A forced response was not applied to the 
Australian study, and was an oversight of the researcher that was missed during the 
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practice runs before data collection began. Thus, Turkish participants were forced to 
respond to each empathy rating question before proceeding to the next randomly 
presented news story stimuli, whereas the Australian participants had the opportunity to 
leave responses blank.  
Each country also saw different news story stimuli, in order to minimise possible 
effects on semantic validity had the Australian news articles been translated into 
Turkish and were presented to participants in the translated form. While we attempted to 
create a uniformness, there is the slim possibility that we may, instead, have created a 
methodological artefact because of the articles presented to participants were not 
identical and, instead, were sample articles. However, the internal consistency analyses 
conducted between empathy ratings collected from each article presented, as well as 
within each sample, does not point to this differential effect having taken place. 
Generalised stimuli provide for better scientific methodology, however, the averages 
were created from all of the empathy responses provided, in the hope that the 
idiosyncrasies would also average out across the articles, and samples. Logarithmic 
transformation was also applied to the terrorism empathy ratings in consideration of the 
skew of empathy ratings reflecting a possible social desirability bias. However, this did 
not change the results and thus analyses were conducted using the average scores of 
total victim and perpetrator empathy questions across articles. Considering that there is 
no prior research into this research question, future research could provide valuable 
information if a replication is conducted without the methodological differences that 
affect this study and perhaps inclusive of an implicit attitudes test as mentioned above.  
As for the statistical analyses of the results, bootstrapping (Efron, 1979) was not 
used as it did not seem necessary given that the large sample size surpassed the N ≥ 377 
recommended minimum sample size to conduct analysis with sufficient power. 
Bootstrapping is a statistical resampling method recommended for non-normal, 
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asymptotic and small sample sizes (Efron, 1979). It may be considered a (pseudo-) 
random simulation because if repeated, it may produce different results (Cumming, 
2014). The use of traditional parametric analysis methods was employed because of the 
sample data’s symmetric, homoscedastic nature (Sharpe, 2004), and also as precaution 
for keeping parsimony of the data samples. The use of the short versions of the scales 
for measuring social dominance orientation, right wing authoritarianism, belief in a 
dangerous world, and belief in a competitive world, is also a limitation of this study. 
Full scale versions are preferred in personality psychology studies as the short versions 
do not quite capture the full extent of the trait intending on being measured, as these 
traits are also made up of factors, or “sub-traits”. For example, the Machiavellianism 
trait as measured by the Short Dark Triad used in this study consists of the two facets 
“Cynical worldview” and “Manipulative traits” (Jones & Paulhus, 2014). 
Recent studies (Kajonius, Persson, Rosenberg, & Garcia, 2016; Persson, 
Kajonius, & Garcia, 2017) suggest that the factor structure of the SD3 is two 
dimensional, with a combined Machiavellianism and psychopathy factor contributing 
more to a general factor than narcissism. Uncertainty of factor structure makes one 
dubious of their utility. Though the SD3 has been criticised for how it may or may not 
capture the underlying facets of each trait (McLarnon & Tarraf, 2017; Muris et al., 
2017) given that they shrink larger inventories of heterogenous content to smaller, even 
homogenous (potentially bloated-specific) inventories, these criticisms are still 
problematic. For example, although traits like Machiavellianism and psychopathy may 
be highly correlated, they are not both linked to impulsivity (Jones & Paulhus, 2011). 
Although the factor structure debate for Machiavellianism has been used as an example, 
this is ongoing for the other traits as well. For example, the factor structure of 
subclinical psychopathy is argued to consist of four factors (i.e., manipulation, callous 
affect, erratic lifestyle, and antisocial behaviour) in the psychopathy measure of the 
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SRP-III (Mahmut et al., 2011; Neal & Sellbom, 2012), and the psychopathy 
measurement of the Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality – 
Institutional Rating Scale (Cooke et al., 2004) is also argued to possibly consist of two 
facets (Sandvik et al., 2012). 
Although important for researchers to take note of these criticisms, it is also 
important to remember that no matter how many “factors” may be identified or de-
identified, the measures are used with the purpose of understanding the trait itself. Even 
though it is suggested that the “gold standard” for measurement of the Dark Triad traits 
are the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale, NPI, and the MACH-IV (Muris et al., 2017), 
combining such assessments alongside the other measures of worldviews, and empathy, 
would have resulted in participant fatigue and higher attrition rates. Even with use of the 
short measures, a total of N = 147 participants were removed from the total sample for 
attrition (i.e., closing the survey in the middle-end stages). The low order facets may 
reveal something new if further research is conducted using the full-scale versions. 
However, as this was an exploratory study into a relatively unstudied field, the short 
versions of the scales were used instead to not impend further on participant fatigue. 
Thus, although the results of this study may be criticised for not having used the 
“golden standard” measurement tools of personality traits, it made use of the shorter 
scales to minimise the amount of participants ceasing their participation due to fatigue, 
and the short versions of all the personality scales have been validated and used in 
similar studies. 
Conclusions 
With a deficit in personality research on terrorism, this study aimed to examine 
the relationships between personality traits and terrorism empathy. This cross-country 
comparison provided an exploratory first on individual differences in empathy towards 
terrorism. The results reflected a relationship between empathy towards victims of 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 52 
 
terrorism, and traditionally communal personality traits such as honesty-humility, 
emotionality, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness to experience. The results 
also reflected a relationship between empathy towards perpetrators of terrorism, and 
traditionally agentic personality traits such as narcissism, and dangerous world beliefs, 
and religiousness. There also was a relationship between lower empathy towards 
perpetrators of terrorism and higher beliefs that the world is a dangerous place. 
Country differences revealed Turkish participants are higher in Dark Triad traits 
than Australians, as well as higher in social dominance orientation, right-wing 
authoritarianism, and religiousness. Australian participants had more empathy towards 
both victims and perpetrators of terrorism than Turkish participants. Sex differences in 
personality traits replicated previous findings of men being higher in Dark Triad traits 
than women, as well as being more right-wing authoritarian, social dominance 
orientated, religious, and believed in a competitive world, compared to women. Women 
were higher in Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, and Conscientiousness than men were. 
Thus, men seemed to display a “darker” personality, than the “lighter” personality of 
women. The implications of these findings were discussed in relation to the current 
threat of terrorism in Australia and Turkey. 
This study provided a first insight of the individual differences in terrorism 
empathy between two countries with different risks of terrorism incidents, and how 
worldviews and broadband personality traits interact with these terrorism empathy 
biases. The results imply that there are individual differences in personality traits 
associated with perpetrator empathy, and provides support for the idea of the 
heterogeneity of terrorists. The findings also indicate that the Dark Triad traits may be 
adaptive, agentic qualities in dangerous and unpredictable environments, and this may 
then facilitate terrorism biases of having less empathy towards victims of terrorism, and 
more empathy towards perpetrators of terrorism. The findings may be used to inform 
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policy development on a governmental level and might eventually be utilised when 
screening individuals for terrorism-related suspicions. 
  
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 54 
 
References 
Allport, G. W. (1960). Personality and social encounter: Selected essays. Oxford, 
England: Beacon. 
Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba 
Press.   
Altemeyer, B. (1988). Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism. 
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the 
HEXACO model of personality structure. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 11, 150-166. doi: 10.1177/1088868306294907 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2016). 2016 Census: Religion. Cat. No. 2071.0, ABS: 
Canberra. Viewed on the 1st October 2017. 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/2071.0~2016
~Main%20Features~Religion%20Data%20Summary~25> 
Bandura, A. (1969). Principles of behavior modification. New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston.  
Bartholow, B. D., Sestir, M. A., & Davis, E. B. (2005). Correlates and consequences of 
exposure to video game violence: Hostile personality, empathy, and aggressive 
behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1573-1586.  
 doi: 10.1177/0146167205277205 
Barrick, M. R., Mount, M. K., & Li, N. (2013). The theory of purposeful work 
behavior: The role of personality, higher-order goals, and job characteristics. 
Academy of Management Review, 38, 132-153. doi: 10.5465/amr.2010.0479 
Barros, C. P. (2003). An intervention analysis of terrorism: The Spanish ETA case. 
Defence and Peace Economics, 14, 401-412.     
 doi: 10.1080/1024269032000085170 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 55 
 
Baskin-Sommers, A., Krusemark, E., & Ronningstam, E. (2014). Empathy in 
narcissistic personality disorder: From clinical and empirical 
perspectives. Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 5, 323-
333. doi: 10.1037/per0000061 
Baughman, H. M., Jonason, P. K., Lyons, M., & Vernon, P. A. (2014). Liar liar pants on 
fire: Cheater strategies linked to the dark triad. Personality and Individual 
 Differences, 71, 35-38. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2014.07.019 
Bear, G. G., Manning, M. A., & Izard, C. E. (2003). Responsible behavior: The 
importance of social cognition and emotion. School Psychology Quarterly, 18, 
140-157. doi: 10.1521/scpq.18.2.140.21857 
Bernard, V., Ottenberg, P., & Redl, F. (1965). Dehumanization: A composite 
psychological defense in relation to modern war. Behavioral Science and Human 
Survival, 64-82. 
Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. (2002). Cross-cultural 
psychology: Research and applications (2nd Ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Boyns, D., & Ballard, J. D. (2004). Developing a sociological theory for the empirical 
understanding of terrorism. The American Sociologist, 35, 5-25.   
 doi: 10.1007/BF02692394 
Brumbach, B. H., Figueredo, A. J., & Ellis, B. J. (2009). Effects of harsh and 
unpredictable environments in adolescence on development of life history 
strategies. Human Nature, 20, 25-51. doi: 10.1007/s12110-009-9059-3 
Bruneau, E. (2016, November). Understanding the terrorist mind. In Cerebrum: The 
Dana forum on brain science (Vol. 2016). Dana Foundation. 
Buss, A. H., & Plomin, R. (2014). Temperament (PLE: Emotion): Early developing 
personality traits (Vol. 3). Psychology Press. 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 56 
 
Buss, D. M. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: A paradigm for psychological science. 
Psychological Inquiry, 6, 1-30.  
Cattell, R. B. (1965). The scientific analysis of personality. Chicago: Aldine.  
Cooke, D. J., Hart, S. D., & Logan, C. (2004). Comprehensive Assessment of 
Psychopathic Personality - Institutional Rating Scale (CAPP-IRS). Unpublished 
manuscript. 
Crowson, H. M. (2009). Right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation 
as mediators of worldview beliefs on attitudes related to the war on terror. Social 
Psychology, 40, 93-103. doi: 10.1027/1864-9335.40.2.93 
Cuming, G. (2014). The new statistics: Why and how. Psychological Science, 25, 7-29. 
 doi: 10.1177/0956797613504966 
de Waal, F. (1996). Good natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other 
animals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Duckitt, J., & Fisher, K. (2003). The impact of social threat on worldview and 
ideological attitudes. Political Psychology, 24, 199-222. doi: 10.1111/0162-
895X.00322 
Dunn, K. M., Forrest, J., Burnley, I., & McDonald, A. (2004). Constructing racism in 
Australia. Australian Journal of Social Issues, 39, 409-430. 
doi:10.1080/00420980601185676 
Efron, B. (1979). Bootstrap methods: Another look at the jackknife. The Annals of 
Statistics, 7, 1-26. 
Eisenberg, N., & Lennon, R. (1983). Sex differences in empathy and related 
capacities. Psychological Bulletin, 94, 100. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.94.1.100 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 57 
 
Eisenberg, N., Miller, P. A., Schaller, M., Fabes, R. A., Fultz, J., Shell, R., & Shea, C. 
L. (1989). The role of sympathy and altruistic personality traits in helping: A 
reexamination. Journal of Personality, 57, 41-67. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
6494.1989.tb00760.x 
Enders, W., & Sandler, T. (1995). Terrorism: Theory and application. Handbook of 
 Defence Economics, 1, 213-249. doi: 10.1016/S1574-0013(05)80011-0 
Feldman, M. (2013). Comparative lone wolf terrorism: Toward a heuristic definition. 
 Democracy and Security, 9, 270-286. doi: 10.1080/17419166.2013.792252 
Fink, K. (2003). Magnitude of trauma and personality change. The International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, 84, 985-995. doi: 10.1516/350U-FHQ2-RTDB-
6HW8 
Freud, S. (1923). The ego and the id. New York: Norton.  
Fulton, J. J., Marcus, D. K., & Payne, K. T. (2010). Psychopathic personality traits and 
risky sexual behavior in college students. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 49, 29-33. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2010.02.035 
George, D., & Mallery, M. (2010). SPSS for Windows Step by Step: A Simple Guide 
and Reference, 17.0 update (10a ed.) Boston: Pearson.  
Gidron, Y., Gal, R., & Zahavi, S. A. (1999). Bus commuters' coping strategies and 
anxiety from terrorism: An example of the Israeli experience. Journal of 
Traumatic Stress, 12, 185-192. doi: 10.1023/A:1024762819880 
Gill, P., Horgan, J., Hunter, S. T., & Cushenbery, L. D. (2013). Malevolent creativity in 
terrorist organizations. The Journal of Creative Behavior, 47, 125-151.  
 doi: 10.1002/jocb.28 
Gioia, G. A., Isquith, P. K., Guy, S., C., & Kenworthy, L. (2000). Behavior rating 
inventory of executive function. Child Neuropsychology, 6, 235-238.  
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 58 
 
Gladden, P. R., Sisco, M., & Figueredo, A. J. (2008). Sexual coercion and life-history 
strategy. Evolution and Human Behavior, 29, 319-326.   
 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.03.003 
Glenn, A. L., Kurzban, R., & Raine, A. (2011). Evolutionary theory and psychopathy. 
Aggression and Violent Behavior, 16, 371-380.  
Guimond, S., Crisp, R. J., De Oliveira, P., Kamiejski, R., Kteily, N., Kuepper, B., ... & 
Sidanius, J. (2013). Diversity policy, social dominance, and intergroup relations: 
Predicting prejudice in changing social and political contexts. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 104, 941-958. doi: 10.1037/a0032069 
Haney, C., Banks, W. C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1973). A study of prisoners and guards in 
a simulated prison. Naval Research Review, 30, 4-17. 
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 10, 252-264. doi: 10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4 
Heffer, G. (2017, October 3). Las Vegas attack: The worst mass shootings in US 
history. Sky News. Retrieved from http://news.sky.com/story/las-vegas-attack-
the-worst-mass-shootings-in-us-history-11064558  
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 61– 83.  
Henry, P. J., Sidanius, J., Levin, S., & Pratto, F. (2005). Social dominance orientation, 
authoritarianism, and support for intergroup violence between Middle East and 
America. Political Psychology, 26, 569-583. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9221.2005.00432.x 
Hermans, D., Houwer, J. D., & Eelen, P. (1994). The affective priming effect: 
Automatic activation of evaluative information in memory. Cognition and 
Emotion, 8, 515-533. doi: 10.1080/02699939408408957 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 59 
 
Hilton, A., & Skrutkowski, M. (2002). Translating instruments into other languages: 
Development and testing processes. Cancer Nursing, 25, 1-7. 
Hodson, G., & Dhont, K. (2015). The person-based nature of prejudice: Individual 
 difference predictors of intergroup negativity. European Review of Social 
 Psychology, 26, 1-42. doi: 10.1080/10463283.2015.1070018 
Hosie, J., Gilbert, F., Simpson, K., & Daffern, M. (2014). An examination of the 
relationship between personality and aggression using the general aggression 
and five factor model. Aggressive Behavior, 40, 189-196. doi: 10.1002/ab.21510 
Howe, J., Falkenbach, D., & Massey, C. (2014). The relationship among psychopathy, 
emotional intelligence, and professional success in finance. International 
Journal of Forensic Mental Health, 13, 337-347.     
 doi: 10.1080/14999013.2014.951103 
Johnson, P. W., & Feldmann, T. B. (1992). Personality types and terrorism: Self-
psychology perspectives. Forensic Reports, 4, 293-303.  
Jonas, E., & Fischer, P. (2006). Terror management and religion: evidence that intrinsic 
religiousness mitigates worldview defense following mortality salience. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 553-567. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.91.3.553 
Jonason, P. K. (2015). How “dark” personality traits and perceptions come together to 
predict racism in Australia. Personality and Individual Differences, 72, 47-51. 
 doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2014.08.030 
Jonason, P.K., Abboud, R., Tomé, J., Dummett, M., & Hazer, A. (2017). The Dark 
Triad traits and self-reported and other-rated creativity. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 117, 150-154. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2017.06.005 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 60 
 
Jonason, P. K., Duineveld, J. J., & Middleton, J. P. (2015). Pathology, pseudopathology, 
and the Dark Triad of personality. Personality and Individual Differences, 78, 
43-47. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2015.01.028 
Jonason, P. K., Icho, A., & Ireland, K. (2016). Resources, harshness, and 
unpredictability: The socioeconomic conditions associated with the Dark Triad 
traits. Evolutionary Psychology, 14, 1-11. doi: 10.1177/1474704915623699 
Jonason, P. K., Koehn, M. A., Okan, C., & O’Connor, P. J. (2018). The role of 
personality in individual differences in yearly earnings. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 121, 170-172. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2017.09.038 
Jonason, P. K., Li, N. P., & Buss, D. M. (2010). The costs and benefits of the Dark 
Triad: Implications for mate poaching and mate retention tactics. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 48, 373-378. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2009.11.003 
Jonason, P. K., Li, N. P., & Czarna, A. Z. (2013). Quick and dirty: Some psychosocial 
costs associated with the Dark Triad in three countries. Evolutionary 
Psychology, 11, 172-185. doi: 10.1177/147470491301100116  
Jonason, P. K., Luevano, V. X., & Adams, H. M. (2012). How the Dark Triad traits 
predict relationship choices. Personality and Individual Differences, 53, 180-
184. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2012.03.007 
Jonason, P. K., Lyons, M., & Blanchard, A. (2015). Birds of a “bad” feather flock 
together: The Dark Triad and mate choice. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 78, 34-38. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2015.01.018 
Jonason, P. K., Valentine, K. A., Li, N. P., & Harbeson, C. L. (2011). Mate-selection 
and the Dark Triad: Facilitating a short-term mating strategy and creating a 
volatile environment. Personality and Individual Differences, 51, 759-763. 
 doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2011.06.025 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 61 
 
Jonason, P.K., & Webster, G.D. (2010). The Dirty Dozen: A concise measure of the 
Dark Triad. Psychological Assessment, 22, 420-432. doi: 10.1037/a0019265 
Jonason, P. K., Webster, G. D., Schmitt, D. P., Li, N. P., & Crysel, L. (2012). The 
antihero in popular culture: Life history theory and the Dark Triad personality 
traits. Review of General Psychology, 16, 192-199. doi: 10.1037/a0027914 
Jonason, P. K., Zeigler-Hill, V., & Okan, C. (2017). Good v. evil: Predicting sinning 
with dark personality traits and moral foundations. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 104, 180-185. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2016.08.002 
Jones, D.N., & Olderbak, S.G. (2014). The associations among dark personalities and 
sexual tactics across different scenarios. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 29, 
1050-1070. doi: 10.1177/0886260513506053 
Jones, D. N., & Paulhus, D. L. (2014). Introducing the Short Dark Triad (SD3): A brief 
measure of dark personality traits. Assessment, 21, 28-41.    
 doi: 10.1177/1073191113514105 
Kajonius, P.J., Persson, B.N., Rosenberg, P., & Garcia, D. (2016). The 
(mis)measurement of the Dark Triad Dirty Dozen: exploitation at the core of the 
scale. PeerJ, 4, e1748. doi:10.7717/peerj.1748 
Kaplan, H. S., & Gangestad, S. W. (2005). Life history theory and evolutionary 
psychology. The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, 68-95. 
Karpat, K. H. (2015). Turkey's politics: The transition to a multi-party system. 
Princeton: University Press. 
Kossowska, M., Trejtowicz, M., de Lemus, S., Bukowski, M., Van Hiel, A., & 
Goodwin, R. (2011). Relationships between right-wing authoritarianism, 
terrorism threat, and attitudes towards restrictions of civil rights: A comparison 
among four European countries. British Journal of Psychology, 102, 245-259. 
 doi: 10.1348/000712610X517262 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 62 
 
Lee, E., Ahn, J., & Kim, Y. J. (2014). Personality traits and self-presentation at 
Facebook. Personality and Individual Differences, 69, 162-167.   
 doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2014.05.020 
Lee, K., Ashton, M. C., Ogunfowara, B., Bourdage, J. S., & Shin, K. H. (2010). The 
personality bases of socio-political attitudes: The role of Honesty-Humility and 
Openness to Experience. Journal of Research in Personality, 44, 115-119.  
 doi: 10.1016/j.jrp.2009.08.007 
Levin, M. E., Luoma, J. B., Vilardaga, R., Lillis, J., Nobles, R., & Hayes, S. C. (2016). 
Examining the role of psychological inflexibility, perspective taking, and 
empathic concern in generalized prejudice. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 46, 180-191. doi: 10.1111/jasp.12355 
Lilienfield, S. O., Latzman, R. D., Watts, A. L., Smith, S. F., & Dutton, K. (2014). 
Correlates of psychopathic personality traits in everyday life: Results from a 
large community survey. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 740.    
 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00740 
Mahmut, M. K., Menictas, C., Stevenson, R. J., & Homewood, J. (2011). Validating the 
factor structure of the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale in a community sample. 
Psychological Assessment, 23, 670-678. doi: 10.1037/a0023090 
Maples, J., L., Lamkin, J., & Miller, J. D. (2014). A test of two brief measures of the 
dark triad: The dirty dozen and short dark triad. Psychological Assessment, 26, 
326-331. doi: 10.1037/a0035084 
McCauley, C., Moskalenko, S., & Van Son, B. (2013). Characteristics of lone-wolf 
violent offenders: A comparison of assassins and school attackers. Perspectives 
on Terrorism, 7, 4-24.  
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 63 
 
McDonald, J. D. (2008). Measuring personality constructs: The advantages and 
disadvantages of self-reports, informant reports and behavioural assessments. 
Enquire, 1, 75-94. 
McDonald, M. M., Donnellan, M. B., & Navarrete, C. D. (2012). A life history 
approach to understanding the dark triad. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 52, 601-605. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2011.12.003 
McKeever, E. R., Reed, R., Pehrson, S., Storey, L., & Cohrs, J. C. (2013). How racist 
violence becomes a virtue: An application of discourse analysis. International 
Journal of Conflict and Violence, 7, 108-120.  
McLarnon, M.J.W., & Tarraf, R.C. (2017). The Dark Triad: Specific or general sources 
of variance? A bifactor exploratory structural equation modeling approach. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 112, 67-73. 
doi:10.1016/j.paid.2017.02.049 
Mroczek, D. K., & Cooper, L. M. (2006). Overview of the proceedings of the 2005 
meeting of the association of research in personality. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 40, 1-4.  
Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., Otgaar, H., & Meijer, E. (2017). The malevolent side of 
human nature: A meta-analysis and critical review of the literature on the Dark 
Triad (narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy). Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 12, 183-204. doi:10.1177/1745691616666070 
Nacos, B. (2016). Mass-mediated terrorism: Mainstream and digital media in terrorism 
and counterterrorism. Third Edition. New York: Routledge. 
Nacos, B. L. (2012). Greater and lesser evils in the war on terrorism and beyond. 
International Studies Review, 14, 308-313. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
2486.2012.01108.x 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 64 
 
Neal, T. M. S., & Sellbom, M. (2012). Examining the factor structure of the Hare self-
report psychopathy scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 94, 244-253. 
 doi: 10.1080/00223891.2011.648294 
Nickerson, A., Bryant, R. A., Rosebrock, L., & Litz, B. T. (2014). The mechanisms of 
psychosocial injury following human rights violations, mass trauma, and torture. 
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 21, 172-191.    
 doi: 10.1111/cpsp.12064 
Nosek, B. A., Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (2005). Understanding and using the 
Implicit Association Test: II. Method variables and construct validity. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 166-180.    
 doi: 10.1177/0146167204271418 
O'Connell, D., & Marcus, D. K. (2016). Psychopathic personality traits predict positive 
attitudes toward sexually predatory behaviors in college men and 
women. Personality and Individual Differences, 94, 372-376.   
 doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2016.02.011 
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
Oswald, F. L., Mitchell, G., Blanton, H., Jaccard, J., & Tetlock, P. E. (2013). Predicting 
ethnic and racial discrimination: A meta-analysis of IAT criterion studies. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 105, 171-192. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0032734.supp 
Özsoy, E., Rauthmann, J. F., Jonason, P. K., & Ardıç, K. (2017). Reliability and validity 
of the Turkish versions of Dark Triad Dirty Dozen (DTDD-T), Short Dark Triad 
(SD3-T), and Single Item Narcissism Scale (SINS-T). Personality and 
Individual Differences, 117, 11-14. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2017.05.019 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 65 
 
Parks-Leduc, L., Feldman, G., & Bardi, A. (2015). Personality traits and personal 
values: A meta-analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 19, 3-29. 
doi: 10.1177/1088868314538548 
Paulhus, D. L., & Vazire, S. (2007). The self-report method. Handbook of Research 
 Methods in Personality Psychology, 1, 224-239. 
Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism, 
 Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 
 556-563. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(02)00505-6 
Persson, B.N., Kajonius, P.J., & Garcia, D. (2017). Revisiting the structure of the Short 
Dark Triad. Assessment. Advance online. doi:10.1177/1073191117701192 
Piko, B. F., & Pinczés, T. (2014). Impulsivity, depression and aggression among 
adolescents. Personality and Individual Differences, 69, 33-37. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.05.008 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L., & Malle, B. (1994). Social dominance 
 orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. 
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 741–763. 
Roberts, B. W., & Jackson, J. J. (2008). Sociogenomic personality psychology. Journal 
of personality, 76, 1523-1544. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00530.x 
Roff, D. (1992). The evolution of life histories: Theory and analysis. New York: 
Chapman & Hall.  
Rogers, C. R. (1959). A theory of therapy, personality and interpersonal relationships, 
as developed in the client-centred framework. In Koch, A. (Ed.), Psychology: A 
study of a science (Vol. 3). New York: McGraw Hill.  
Ross, S. R., & Rausch, M. K. (2001). Psychopathic attributes and achievement 
dispositions in a college sample. Personality and Individual Differences, 30, 
471–480. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(00)00038-6 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 66 
 
Rydgren, J. (2007). The sociology of the radical right. Annual Review of Sociology, 33, 
241-262. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131752 
Sandvik, A. M., Hansen, A. L., Kristensen, M. V., Johnsen, B. H., Logan, C., & 
Thornton, D. (2012). Assessment of psychopathy: Inter-correlations between 
Psychopathy Checklist Revised, Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic 
Personality – Institutional Rating Scale, and Self-Report of Psychopathy Scale-
III. International Journal of Forensic Mental Health, 11, 280-288.   
 doi: 10.1080/14999013.2012.746756 
Santiago, J. M., McCall-Perez, F., Gorcey, M., & Beigel, A. (1985). Long-term 
psychological effects of rape in 35 rape victims. American Journal of 
Psychiatry, 142, 1338-1340. 
Schmitt, D. P., Relao, A., Voracek, M., & Allik, J. (2008). Why can’t a man be more 
like a woman? Sex differences in Big Five personality traits across 55 cultures. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94, 168-182. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.94.1.168 
Sharpe, D. (2004). Beyond Significance Testing: Reforming Data Analysis Methods in 
Behavioral Research. [Review of the book Beyond Significance Testing: 
Reforming Data Analysis Methods in Behavioral Research. R. B. Kline]. 
Canadian Psychology, 45, 317-319. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0087004 
Sibley, C. G., Harding, J. F., Perry, R., Asbrock, F., & Duckitt, J. (2010). Personality 
and prejudice: Extension to the HEXACO personality model. European Journal 
of Personality, 24, 515-534. doi: 10.1002/per.750 
Silke, A. (2001). The devil you know: Continuing problems with research on 
terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 13, 1-14.    
 doi: 10.1080/09546550109609697 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 67 
 
Singer, T., & Klimecki, O. M. (2014). Empathy and compassion. Current Biology, 24, 
R875-R878. 
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behaviour. New York: Macmillan. 
Smith, C. A., & Frieze, I. H. (2003). Examining rape empathy from the perspective of 
the victim and the assailant. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33, 476-498. 
 doi: 10.1111/j.1559-1816.2003.tb01907.x 
Smith, C. V., Hadden, B. W., Webster, G. D., Jonason, P. K., Gesselman, A. N., & 
Crysel, L. C. (2014). Mutually attracted or repulsed? Actor-partner 
interdependence models of Dark Triad traits and relationship outcomes. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 67, 35-41.     
 doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2014.01.044 
Sommier, I. (2002). “Terrorism” as total violence? International Social Science 
Journal, 54, 473-481. doi: 10.1111/1468-2451.00401 
Stitka, L. J., Bauman, C. W., Aramovich, N. P., & Morgan, G. S. (2010). 
Confrontational and preventative policy responses to terrorism: Anger wants a 
fight and fear wants “them” to go away. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 
28, 375-384. doi: 10.1207/s15324834basp2804_11 
Strosser, G., Jonason, P. K., Lawson, R., Reid, A. N., & Vittum-Jones, A. W. (2016). 
When private reporting is more positive than public reporting: Pluralistic 
ignorance towards atheists. Social Psychology, 47, 150-162. 
https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000267 
Tausch, N., Becker, J., Spears, R., Christ, O., Saab, R., Singh, P., & Siddiqui, R.N. 
(2011). Explaining radical group behaviour: Developing emotion and efficacy 
routes to normative and non-normative collective action. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 101, 129-148. doi: 10.1037/a0022728 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 68 
 
Trapnell, P. D., & Paulhus, D. L. (2012) Agentic and communal values: Their scope and 
measurement. Journal of Personality Assessment, 94, 39-52. 
doi:10.1080/00223891.2011.627968 
Turiano, N. A., Pitzer, L., Armour, C., Karlamangla, A., Ryff, C. D., & Mroczek, D. K. 
(2011). Personality trait level and change as predictors of health outcomes: 
Findings from a national study of Americans (MIDUS). Journals of Gerontology 
Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 67, 4-12. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbr072 
Veselka, L., Schermer, J.A., Martin, R.A., & Vernon, P.A. (2010). Relations between 
humor styles and the Dark Triad traits of personality. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 48, 772-774. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2010.01.017 
Victoroff, J. (2005). The mind of the terrorist: A review and critique of psychological 
approaches. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 49, 3-42.    
 doi: 10.1177/0022002704272040 
Werts, H., Scheepers, P., & Lubbers, M. (2012). Euro-scepticism and radical right-wing 
voting in Europe, 2002-2008: Social cleavages, socio-political attitudes and 
contextual characteristics determining voting for the radical right. European 
Union Politics, 14, 183-205. doi: 10.1177/1465116512469287   
White, A. E., Li, Y. J., Griskevicius, V., Neuberg, S. L., & Kenrick, D. T. (2013). 
Putting all your eggs in one basket: Life-history strategies, bet hedging, and 
diversification. Psychological Science, 24, 715-722.    
 doi: 10.1177/0956797612461919 
White, B. A. (2014). Who cares when nobody is watching? Psychopathic traits and 
empathy in prosocial behaviors. Personality and Individual Differences, 56, 116-
121. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2013.08.033 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 69 
 
Zeigler-Hill, V., Besser, A., & Marcus, D. K. (2017). The roles of personality traits and 
perceived threat in the attitudes of Israelis toward peace with the Palestinians. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 116, 296-300.    
 doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2017.05.007 
Zimbardo, P. G. (1973). On the ethics of intervention in human psychological research: 
With special reference to the Stanford prison experiment. Cognition, 2, 243-256. 
 doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(72)90014-5 
Zimbardo, P. G. (2007). Lucifer Effect. New York: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 
Zuckerman, M., & Kuhlman, D. M. (2000). Personality and risk‐taking: Common 
bisocial factors. Journal of Personality, 68, 999-1029. doi: 10.1111/1467-
6494.00124 
 
Running head: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TERRORISM EMPATHY 70 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and sex differences. 
 
M (SD) t d 
Dark Triad Overall Men Women     
  Narcissism 2.82 (0.62) 2.99 (0.56) 2.71 (0.64) 5.23** 0.47 
  Machiavellianism 3.18 (0.68) 3.38 (0.63) 3.05 (0.67) 5.79** 0.51 




   
  Honesty-Humility 3.57 (0.62) 3.40 (0.65) 3.68 (0.58) -5.30** -0.45 
  Emotionality 3.29 (0.63) 2.98 (0.56) 3.50 (0.59) -10.15** -0.90 
  Extraversion 3.28 (0.67) 3.27 (0.66) 3.28 (0.67) -0.08 -0.02 
  Agreeableness 3.20 (0.56) 3.20 (0.53) 3.20 (0.58) 0.12 0.00 
  Conscientiousness 3.48 (0.57) 3.40 (0.53) 3.53 (0.59) -2.71** -0.23 
  Openness to Experience 3.41 (0.62) 3.36 (0.62) 3.45 (0.62) -1.59 -0.15 
Worldviews 
 
      Right Wing Authoritarianism  2.60 (0.62) 2.70 (0.62) 2.54 (0.61) 2.96** 0.26 
  Social Dominance Orientation 2.31 (0.72) 2.61 (0.66) 2.12 (0.69) 8.25** 0.73 
  Belief in Dangerous World 3.24 (0.64) 3.21 (0.66) 3.26 (0.63) -0.89 -0.08 
  Belief in Competitive World 2.34 (0.59) 2.50 (0.56) 2.24 (0.59) 5.15** 0.45 
  Religiousness 2.86 (1.20) 3.10 (1.22) 2.72 (1.17) 3.67** 0.32 
Terrorism Biases 
 
      Victim Empathy 4.11 (0.81) 3.90 (0.88) 4.24 (0.74) -4.99** -0.42 
  Perpetrator Empathy 2.69 (1.02) 2.75 (1.04) 2.65 (1.01) 1.15 0.10 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
     Notes. d is Cohen's d for effect size 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and country differences. 
 
M (SD) t d 
Dark Triad Australia  Turkey     
  Narcissism 2.63 (0.61) 3.06 (0.55) -8.66** -0.74 
  Machiavellianism 2.97 (0.67) 3.45 (0.58) -8.99** -0.77 
  Psychopathy 1.95 (0.64) 2.25 (0.58) -5.74** -0.49 
HEXACO 
    
  Honesty-Humility 3.55 (0.63) 3.58 (0.61) -0.55 -0.05 
  Emotionality 3.40 (0.63) 3.15 (0.60) 4.82** 0.41 
  Extraversion 3.28 (0.67) 3.27 (0.67) 0.23 0.01 
  Agreeableness 3.22 (0.59) 3.18 (0.53) 0.90 0.07 
  Conscientiousness 3.51 (0.59) 3.44 (0.53) 1.37 0.12 
  Openness to Experience 3.40 (0.62) 3.43 (0.62) -0.53 -0.05 
Worldviews 
  
    Right Wing Authoritarianism  2.57 (0.64) 2.64 (0.58) -1.16 -0.11 
  Social Dominance Orientation 2.01 (0.71) 2.69 (0.52) -12.59** -1.09 
  Belief in Dangerous World 3.01 (0.67) 3.54 (0.45) -10.59** -0.93 
  Belief in Competitive World 2.23 (0.63) 2.48 (0.51) -5.16** -0.44 
  Religiousness 2.45 (1.23) 3.40 (0.92) -10.18** -0.87 
Terrorism Biases 
  
    Victim Empathy 4.24 (0.73) 3.94 (0.88) 4.39** 0.37 
  Perpetrator Empathy 2.90 (0.99) 2.41 (0.99) 5.89** 0.49 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
    Notes. d is Cohen's d for effect size 
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 Table 3. How broadband and narrowband personality traits and worldviews correlate with empathy towards Terrorism 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 -- 
             
  
2 .40** -- 
            
  
3 .38** .47** -- 
           
  
4 -.34** -.38** -.42** -- 
          
  
5 -.26** -.18** -.29** .09* -- 
   
      
  
6 -.48** -.08 -.11* -.03 -.18** --   
      
  
7 .14** -.22** -.39** .28** -.01 .11** --  
      
  
8 .01 -.06 -.29** .22** -.04 .21** .05 -- 
      
  
9 .13** -.00 -.13** .00 -.07 .19** .05 .20** -- 
     
  
10 .08 .15** .15** .07 .00 .00 .04 -.02 -.39** -- 
    
  
11 .37** .45** .44** -.27** -.24** -.05 -.16** -.17** -.16** .34** -- 
   
  
12 .12** .19** .13** .12** .06 -.10* -.08 -.06 -.03 .19** .17** -- 
  
  
13 .25** .49** .53** -.42** -.20** -.17** -.30** -.25** -.16** .13** .57** .12** -- 
 
  
14 .18** .19** .11* .17** -.03 .06 .11* -.04 -.10* .49** .27** .33** -.03 -- 
  15 -.09* -.08 -.27** .14** .23** .14** .11* .14** .19** -.08 -.30** .02 -.33** -.44 -- 
 16 -.09* .01 .04 -.14** .00 -.05 -.05 -.05 .04 -.08 -.07 -.25** .04 -.14** .20** -- 
* p < .05, ** p < .01                       
Note: 1 = Narcissism, 2 = Machiavellianism, 3 = Psychopathy, 4 = Honesty-Humility, 5 = Emotionality, 6 = Extraversion, 7 = Agreeableness, 8 = 
Conscientiousness, 9 = Openness to Experience, 10 = Right-Wing Authoritarianism, 11 = Social Dominance Orientation. 12 = Belief in a Dangerous 
World, 13 = Belief in a Competitive World, 14 = Religiousness, 15 = Victim Empathy, 16 = Perpetrator Empathy 
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Table 4. How broadband and narrowband personality traits, and worldviews correlate with empathy towards Terrorism in men and women. 
 
Perpetrator Empathy Victim Empathy 
Dark Personality Men Women z Men Women z 
  Narcissism -.14* -.09 -0.58 -.01 -.08 0.80 
  Machiavellianism .13 -.08 2.41* .19** -.19** 4.40** 
  Psychopathy .06 .00 0.69 -.20** -.25** 0.60 
HEXACO 
        Honesty-Humility -.14* -.12* -0.23 .04 .15** -1.27 
  Emotionality -.05 .07 -1.37 .07 .24** -2.00* 
  Extraversion -.08 -.03 -0.57 .23** .08 1.76 
  Agreeableness -.05 .10 -1.72 .08 .14* -0.70 
  Conscientiousness -.07 -.02 -0.57 .12 .13* -0.12 
  Openness to Experience  .04 .04 0.00 .21** .16** 0.59 
Worldviews 
        Right Wing Authoritarianism  -.17* -.03 -1.62 -.11 .00 -1.26 
  Social Dominance Orientation -.08 -.10 0.23 -.20** -.29** 1.10 
  Belief in Dangerous World -.25** -.25** 0.00 -.01 .03 -0.46 
  Belief in Competitive World .06 .00 0.69 -.28** -.31** 0.38 
  Religiousness -.14* -.16** 0.23 .05 -.06 1.26 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
      Notes. z is Fisher's z to compare independent correlations 
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Table 5. How broadband and narrowband personality traits, and worldviews correlate with empathy towards Terrorism in Australia and 
Turkey. 
 
Perpetrator Empathy Victim Empathy 
Dark Personality Australia Turkey z Australia Turkey z 
  Narcissism -.00 -.02 0.23 .14* .10 0.47 
  Machiavellianism .09 .14* -0.59 -.18* .19** 0.12 
  Psychopathy .08 .12 -0.47 -.34** -.12 -2.72** 
HEXACO 
        Honesty-Humility -.16** -.11 -0.59 .20** .09 1.31 
  Emotionality -.04 -.07 0.35 .31** .07 2.92** 
  Extraversion -.01 -.11 1.17 .17** .11 0.71 
  Agreeableness .01 .08 -0.82 .15** .05 1.18 
  Conscientiousness -.05 -.08 0.35 .18** .07 1.30 
  Openness to Experience  .02 .08 -0.70 .14* .26** -1.46 
Worldviews 
        Right Wing Authoritarianism  -.10 -.03 -0.82 -.03 -.12 1.05 
  Social Dominance Orientation .03 .10 -0.82 -.32** -.14* -2.22* 
  Belief in Dangerous World -.17** -.19** 0.24 .06 .20** -1.66 
  Belief in Competitive World .07 .13* -0.71 -.40** -.18** -2.81** 
  Religiousness -.05 -.06 0.12 .04 .03 0.12 
* p < .05, ** p < .01 
      Notes. z is Fisher's z to compare independent correlations 
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 Table 6. Mediation analyses of sex and country differences on Victim Empathy 
and Perpetrator Empathy 
  ∆R² 








Emotionality .03** .04** 
 
Social Dominance Orientation .06** .06** 
 
Belief in a Dangerous World 
  
.03** 
Belief in a Competitive World .08** .09** 
 
Religiousness     .00 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
   
Note. A = Victim Empathy, B = Perpetrator Empathy; ∆R² at Step 2.  






Table 7. Auxiliary mediation analyses of sex and country differences in the Dark Triad traits 
  ∆R² 














Social Dominance Orientation .10** .06** .15** .10** 
 
.14** 







Belief in a Competitive World .05** .03** .20** .18** .23** .24** 
Religiousness .02** .00 .03** .00 .00 .00 
* p < .05, ** p < .001 
      
Note. A = Narcissism; B = Machiavellianism; C = Psychopathy; ∆R² at Step 2.  




Please answer the following questions about your religious/spiritual beliefs and practices, on 
a scale from 1-5 (1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree): 
1. I am a religious/spiritual person. 
2. I pray very often. 
3. I attend religious services often. 
4. I do strictly adhere to the teachings of my faith. 
5. My religious beliefs are very strong. 
  




On the following pages you will find a series of statements about you.  Please read each statement 
and decide how much you agree or disagree with that statement.  Then write your response in the 
space next to the statement using the following scale: 
    5 = strongly agree 
    4 = agree  
    3 = neutral (neither agree nor disagree) 
    2 = disagree 
    1 = strongly disagree 
Please answer every statement, even if you are not completely sure of your response. 
1
. 
I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery. 
2
. 
I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute. 
3
. 
I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me. 
4
. 
I feel reasonably satisfied with myself overall. 
5
. 
I would feel afraid if I had to travel in bad weather conditions. 
6
. 
I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it would 
succeed. 7
. 
I'm interested in learning about the history and politics of other countries. 
8
. 
I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal. 
9
. 
People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others. 
1
0. 
I rarely express my opinions in group meetings. 
1
1. 
I sometimes can't help worrying about little things. 
1
2. 
If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million dollars. 
1
3. 
I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting. 
1
4. 
When working on something, I don't pay much attention to small details. 
1
5. 
People sometimes tell me that I'm too stubborn. 
1
6. 
I prefer jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working alone. 
1
7. 
When I suffer from a painful experience, I need someone to make me feel comfortable. 
1
8. 
Having a lot of money is not especially important to me. 
1
9. 
I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time. 
2
0. 
I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought. 
2
1. 
People think of me as someone who has a quick temper. 
2
2. 
On most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic. 
2
3. 
I feel like crying when I see other people crying. 
2
4. 
I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is. 




If I had the opportunity, I would like to attend a classical music concert. 
2
6. 
When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized. 
2
7. 
My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is “forgive and forget”. 
2
8. 
I feel that I am an unpopular person. 
2
9. 
When it comes to physical danger, I am very fearful. 
3
0. 
If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes. 
3
1. 
I’ve never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopaedia. 
3
2. 
I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by.  
3
3. 
I tend to be lenient in judging other people. 
3
4. 
In social situations, I’m usually the one who makes the first move. 
3
5. 
I worry a lot less than most people do. 
3
6. 
I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large. 
3
7. 
People have often told me that I have a good imagination. 
3
8. 
I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time. 
3
9. 
I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me. 
4
0. 
The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends. 
4
1. 
I can handle difficult situations without needing emotional support from anyone else. 
4
2. 
I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods. 
4
3. 
I like people who have unconventional views. 
4
4. 
I make a lot of mistakes because I don’t think before I act. 
4
5. 
Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do. 
4
6. 
Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am. 
4
7. 
I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time. 
4
8. 
I want people to know that I am an important person of high status. 
4
9. 
I don’t think of myself as the artistic or creative type. 
5
0. 
People often call me a perfectionist. 
5
1. 
Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative. 
5
2. 
I sometimes feel that I am a worthless person. 
5
3. 
Even in an emergency I wouldn’t feel like panicking. 
5
4. 
I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me. 
5
5. 
I find it boring to discuss philosophy. 
5
6. 
I prefer to do whatever comes to mind, rather than stick to a plan. 
5
7. 
When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them. 




When I’m in a group of people, I’m often the one who speaks on behalf of the group. 
5
9. 
I remain unemotional even in situations where most people get very sentimental. 
6
0. 
I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it. 
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Appendix C 
Short Dark Triad (SD3) 
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements.   
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree  
Strongly 
 
1. It's not wise to tell your secrets.  
2. I like to use clever manipulation to get my way. 
3. Whatever it takes, you must get the important people on your side.  
4. Avoid direct conflict with others because they may be useful in the future.  
5. It’s wise to keep track of information that you can use against people later.  
6. You should wait for the right time to get back at people.  
7. There are things you should hide from other people to preserve your reputation. 
8. Make sure your plans benefit yourself, not others. 
9. Most people can be manipulated. 
10. People see me as a natural leader.  
11. I hate being the centre of attention. (R) 
12. Many group activities tend to be dull without me.   
13. I know that I am special because everyone keeps telling me so.  
14. I like to get acquainted with important people.  
15. I feel embarrassed if someone compliments me.(R) 
16. I have been compared to famous people.  
17. I am an average person.(R) 
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18. I insist on getting the respect I deserve. 
19. I like to get revenge on authorities. 
20. I avoid dangerous situations. (R) 
21. Payback needs to be quick and nasty.  
22. People often say I’m out of control.  
23. It’s true that I can be mean to others.  
24. People who mess with me always regret it. 
25. I have never gotten into trouble with the law. (R). 
26. I enjoy having sex with people I hardly know.   
27. I’ll say anything to get what I want. 
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Appendix D 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) Scale 
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements.   
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree  
Strongly 
 
1) Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn 
2) Nobody should stick to the "straight and narrow". Instead people should break loose and try out 
lots of different ideas and experiences 
3) We should treat protestors and radicals with open arms and open minds, since new ideas are the 
lifeblood of progressive change 
4) The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to 
crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers, if we are going to make the world a 
better place. 
5) Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt every bit as 
good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly 
6) People should pay less attention to the bible and the other old-fashioned forms of religious 
guidance, and instead develop their own personal standards of what is moral and immoral 
7) The real keys to the "good life" are obedience, discipline, and sticking to the straight and 
narrow 
8) What our country really needs instead of more "civil rights", is a good stiff dose of law and 
order      
9) Our country will be great if we honour the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell 
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us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything 
10) Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even if this 
upsets many people 
11) The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead, is to get back to our traditional 
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad ideas 
12) Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anyone else 
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Appendix E 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Scale  
Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements.   
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree  
Strongly 
 
1) It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others 
2) To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups 
3) No one group should dominate in society  
4) Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups  
5) All groups should be given an equal chance in life 
6) We would have fewer problems if we treated people equally 
7) We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible 
8) Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place 
9) We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups 
10) Inferior groups should stay in their place 
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Appendix F 
Belief in a Competitive World (BCW) and Belief in a Dangerous World (BDW) Scale 
 Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements.   
Belief in a Competitive World 
1. It’s a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be ruthless at times. 
2. There is really no such thing as “right” and “wrong”. It all boils down to what you can get 
away with. 
3. One of the most useful skills a person should develop is how to look someone straight in 
the eye and lie convincingly.  
4. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a 
competitive “jungle” in which the fittest survive and succeed, in which power, wealth, and 
winning are everything, and might is right. 
5. Basically people are objects to be quietly and coolly manipulated for one’s own benefit. 
6. Life is not governed by the “survival of the fittest”. We should let compassion and moral 
laws be our guide. 
7. It is better to be loved than to be feared. 
8. Do unto others as you would have them do unto you, and never do anything unfair to 
someone else. 
9. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree  
Strongly 
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10. One should give others the benefit of the doubt. Most people are trustworthy if you have 
faith in them.  
Belief in a Dangerous World  
1. My knowledge and experience tell me that the social world we live in is basically a safe, 
stable and secure place in which most people are fundamentally good. 
2. It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and 
more persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else.  
3. Although it may appear that things are constantly getting more dangerous and chaotic, it 
really isn’t so. Every era has its problems, and a person’s chances of living a safe, 
untroubled life are better today than ever before. 
4. Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. All the signs are pointing to it. 
5. There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure 
meanness, for no reason at all. 
6. The “end” is not near. People who think that earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God 
might be about to destroy the world are being foolish.  
7. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a 
dangerous and unpredictable place, in which good, decent and moral people’s values and 
way of life are threatened and disrupted by bad people.  
8. Despite what one hears about “crime in the street”, there probably isn’t any more now than 
there ever has been. 
9. If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad is likely to happen to him or her; 
we do not live in a dangerous world. 
10. Every day as society become more lawless and bestial, a person’s chances of being robbed, 
assaulted, and even murdered go up and up.  
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Appendix G 
Terrorism Empathy Scales  
 Please rate the degree to which you agree with the following statements.   
Empathy towards Perpetrators of Terrorism 
1. I can understand how powerful a terrorist might feel. 
2. I can empathize with the shame and humiliation an accused terrorist feels during a trial 
to prove terrorism.  
3. I imagine the anger a person would feel at being accused of terrorism.  
4. I can feel the emotional trauma that a person accused of terrorism would feel if the 
terrorism trial were publicized in the press. 
5. I imagine the courage it takes to defend oneself in court against the charges of terrorism.  
 
Empathy towards Victims of Terrorism 
1. I can understand how helpless a terrorist attack victim might feel. 
2. I can feel a person’s helplessness at being forced into living under a terrorist regime. 
3. Hearing about someone who has been through a terror attack makes me feel that 
person’s fear. 
4. I can empathize with the helplessness and fear a terror victim feels after a terror attack. 
5. I can understand why a terror victim feels scared for a long time.  
  
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree  
Strongly 
Disagree Neutral Agree Agree  
Strongly 
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Appendix H 
Real-News Article Stimuli Example 
Please read the following article carefully before proceeding to the next set of questions: 
Explosions, gun shots hit 
Istanbul’s Ataturk airport: 
report 
Staff writers and wires, News Corp Australia Network 
June 29, 2016 10:38pm 
 Suicide bombers attacked Istanbul’s Ataturk airport 
 Explosions and gunfire left at least 41 dead, 239 injured 
 Witnesses tell of horrific moments the attackers opened fire 
 Islamic State is reportedly behind the attacks 
 PM Malcolm Turnbull condemns ISIS, Aussies urged not to travel to Istanbul 
WARNING: Graphic 
The first departures took off from Istanbul’s Ataturk international airport, as the major international 
transit hub partially resumed operations following a deadly attack that killed 41 people and 
wounded 239 others. 
Planes had already begun landing just before dawn on Wednesday, after the airport - one of the 
largest in the region - had been totally shut for several hours following the attack the previous 
evening which was focused on the arrivals terminal.  
Delays remained widespread after hundreds of flights were cancelled or postponed immediately 
after the attack. 
Turkish Airlines, which had to cancel more than 340 flights, was offering refunds or alternative 
tickets, but there still was chaos for many travellers. 
The building’s exterior and interior had suffered some damage in the multiple explosions and 
gunfights between police and the assailants. Workers were still cleaning up blood and people could 
still see bullet holes left behind from the terror attack. 
The triple suicide bombing killed 13 foreign nationals. 
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A Turkish official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said five of the dead were from Saudi 
Arabia, two were from Iraq, and one from Tunisia, Uzbekistan, China, Iran, Ukraine and Jordan. 
109 of the 239 wounded have been discharged from hospital. 
No one has claimed Tuesday’s attack yet but Turkish authorities said they suspect Islamic State 
jihadists. 
Turkey remains on high security alert after a series of attacks on its soil blamed not only on the IS 
group but also Kurdish militants. 
Iranian Foreign Minister Javed Zarif tweeted on Tuesday night: “Terror rears its ugly head yet again 
in our friend & neighbour’s airport. “Extremist violence is a global threat; we must confront it 
together.”  
Greece, Russia, Albania, France and other countries around the world have offered their 
condolences and condemned the attacks suspected to have been carried out by Islamic State.  
As Turkey counts the cost of its latest terror atrocity, the country’s president has vowed to continue 
the campaign against Islamic militants. 
Suicide bombers opened fire before blowing themselves up at the entrance to Ataturk International 
Airport. 
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Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan condemned the attack, which took place during the 
Muslim holy month of Ramadan. He said the attack “shows that terrorism strikes with no regard to 
faith and values” and called on the international community to take a firm stand against terrorism 
“Turkey has the power, determination and capacity to continue the fight against terrorism until the 
end,” Erdogan said. 
 
WITNESSES TELL OF TERROR 
An AFP photographer saw bodies covered with sheets at the terminal, which suffered considerable 
damage but was being repaired on Wednesday. 
Bullet holes peppered the windows and shattered glass lay on the floor, while abandoned luggage 
was scattered everywhere. Hundreds of police and firefighters including forensic officers were at 
the scene. 
“Somebody came and shot at us and then my sister ran,” Otfah Mohamed Abdullah told AFP. 
“I don’t know which way she ran and after that I fell down. I was on the ground till he (the gunman) 
stopped... I can’t find my sister.” 
Another witness told of the terrifying moment he and his wife came “face to face with one of the 
attackers”, as the gunman opened fire with AK-47s in the Brussels-style attack. 
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